Drugs and Criminal Responsibility by Benton, Edward H. et al.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 33 
Issue 5 Issue 5 - October 1980 Article 3 
10-1980 
Drugs and Criminal Responsibility 
Edward H. Benton 
Andrew Bor 
William H. Leech 
Joyce A. Levy 
Samuel D. Lipshie 
See next page for additional authors 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Food and Drug Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Edward H. Benton, Andrew Bor, William H. Leech, Joyce A. Levy, Samuel D. Lipshie, Thomas B. Mitchell, 
and Gary M. Brown, Drugs and Criminal Responsibility, 33 Vanderbilt Law Review 1145 (1980) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol33/iss5/3 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Drugs and Criminal Responsibility 
Authors 
Edward H. Benton, Andrew Bor, William H. Leech, Joyce A. Levy, Samuel D. Lipshie, Thomas B. Mitchell, 
and Gary M. Brown 
This note is available in Vanderbilt Law Review: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol33/iss5/3 
SPECIAL PROJECT
DRUGS AND CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
With the use of alcohol and other drugs becoming ever more
prevalent in today's society, the law must adjust to a variety of
problems. One response has been the imposition of severe criminal
penalties against those who use drugs or commit crimes to support
their increasingly expensive use of various drugs. An often over-
looked problem, however, and one that undoubtedly deserves
greater critical analysis and legal response, is that of the person
who commits crimes while under the influence of alcohol or other
drugs.
This Special Project deals with the interaction between drugs
and criminal responsibility and addresses the question of when
may a person who commits a crime under the influence of a drug
plead that influence as a defense to criminal responsibility. The
Special Project initially explores the effects of the more commonly
encountered drugs upon the human body. The Special Project then
undertakes to examine intoxication as a defense, the insanity de-
fense, and various constitutional issues that may be raised by crim-
inal defendants. Within each area, the Special Project sets forth
the traditional analytical framework and attempts to apply it to
the problems of persons under the influence of drugs. The Special
Project then concludes that analysis is seriously lacking in many of
the areas involved and contends that either the courts or the legis-
latures must increase their expertise in these areas and respond to
these potentially serious flaws in the criminal legal system.
I. DRUGS AND THEIR EFFECTS
A. Cocaine
Cocaine is the active alkaloid found in coca leaves (Erythrox-
ylon coca), which contain 0.5% to 1.5% of the drug by weight.1
1. NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR DRUG ABUSE, INFORMATION REPORT SERIES No. 11,
CocAINE 3 (1972) [hereinafter cited as REPORT SERIES].
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Cocaine was first isolated in the mid-nineteenth century and used
as a local anesthetic. Although the Indians of South America chew
coca leaves to ingest cocaine, the drug is usually not consumed in
this fashion. Instead, it appears as a white crystalline powder that
may be sniffed or dissolved in water and injected.
Cocaine stimulates the central and sympathetic nervous sys-
tems,2 producing increased breathing and basal metabolic rates.
When initially administered, the drug causes vasoconstriction that
results in a rise in blood pressure.$ In larger doses, cocaine may
produce headache, pallor, cold sweat, rapid and weak pulse, trem-
ors, fast and irregular shallow breathing, nausea, convulsions, and
unconsciousness.4 In high doses, the drug may be lethal. "Cocaine
is toxic because the central stimulation that is the immediate effect
of the drug is followed by depression of the higher nervous cen-
ters."5 Death results from respiratory failure when the medullary
centers of the brain are depressed. Acute cocaine poisoning may be
treated with an intravenous, short-acting barbiturate.
Although no tolerance is developed to cocaine a user may ini-
tially need several doses to become sensitized to the drug's effects.
Because cocaine is psychologically, not physically, addicting, absti-
nence produces no traumatic physical symptoms comparable to
narcotics withdrawal.7 Abstinence, however, may result in psycho-
logical symptoms such as depression and craving for the drug.
The psychophysiological effects of cocaine are similar to those
of the amphetaminess-excitation, restlessness, euphoria, and feel-
ings of heightened physical, sexual, and mental power.' Chronic in-
halation in moderate doses results in nervousness, insomnia that
induces physical exhaustion and mental confusion, weight loss, de-
2. C. KORNETSKY, PHARMACOLOGY 216 (1976).
3. REPORT SERIES, supra note 1, at 7.
4. L. GRINSPOON & J. BAICAR, COCAINE 111 (1976).
5. DeLong, The Drugs and Their Effects, in DEALING WITH DRUG ABUSE 105 (1972). A
combination of heroin or morphine and cocaine, called a "speedball," is sometimes taken to
counteract the abrupt emotional shift from euphoria to depression. REPORT SERIES, supra
note 1, at 10.
6. REPORT SERIES, supra note 1, at 276.
7. E. BRECHER & EDITORS OF CONSUMER REPORTS, LICIT AND ILLICIT DRUGS 276 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as E. BRECHER].
8. 0. RAY, DRUGS, SOCIETY, AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 275-76 (2d ed. 1978). Both cocaine
and amphetamines act as stimulants. Cocaine, however, has a shorter duration of action.
When the drugs are inhaled, as opposed to being administered intravenously, their psycho-
logical effects may differ. Id.
9. L. GRINSPOON & J. BAKALAR, supra note 4, at 95-96; REPORT SERIES, supra note 1, at
[Vol. 33:11451146
1980] SPECIAL PROJECT: DRUGS 1147
terioration of the nasal mucous membranes and cartilage,1" and
sometimes mild paranoia."' In addition, frequent and heavy co-
caine use results in anxiety, noise hypersensitivity, graphobia
(compulsive scribbling), memory disturbances, fast pulse, and im-
potence.12 Chronic administration of large doses produces a charac-
teristic paranoid psychosis" that may cause acts of violence.1 "In
this state hallucinations are not uncommon and abnormal sensa-
tions induced by cocaine in the peripheral nerves may convince the
hyperexcited user that animals are burrowing under his skin."15 In
the later stages of chronic cocaine intoxication, there may be
twitching, cold in the extremities, spontaneous abortion, and even
paralysis.16
B. Depressants
1. Barbiturates
The barbiturates 17 are a large class of central nervous system
depressants" that are derived from barbituric acid. 9 The central
10. Because cocaine causes constriction of nasal blood vessels, steady moderate use of
the drug commonly leads to rhinitis. Initially, cocaine stimulates respiration and dries the
nasal mucosa; this effect then rebounds into congestion. Perforation of the septum may oc-
cur in extreme cases. L. GRINSPOON & J. BAKALAR, supra note 4, at 134. "The most common
symptoms are runny, clogged, inflamed, swollen, or ulcerated noses which may be painfully
sensitive and frequently bleed." Id.
11. Id. at 130.
12. Id. at 137.
13. E. BRECHER, supra note 7, at 275.
14. M. GERALD, PHARMACOLOGY 291 (1974). "The behavior of individuals in a hyper-
excited, toxic cocaine state is often irrational and violent, much more so than in the case of
the heroin addict." REPORT SERIES, supra note 1, at 8.
15. Id. These sensations, known as formication, are commonly called "cocaine bugs."
16. L. GRINSPOON & J. BAKALAR, supra note 4, at 137.
17. Slang terms for barbiturates include "Barbs," "Blockbusters," "Bluebirds," "Blue
Devils," "Blues," "Christmas Trees," "Downers," "Green Dragons," "Mexican Reds," "Neb-
bies," "Nimbies," "Pajaro Rojo," "Pink Ladies," "Pinks," "Rainbows," "Red and Blues,"
"Redbirds," "Red Devils," "Reds," "Sleeping Pills," "Stumbles," "Yellow Jackets," and
"Yellows." DRUG ENFORCEMENT, July 1979, at 39.
18. More than 2,500 depressants have been synthesized, but only about a dozen are
widely used today. Harvey, Hypnotics and Sedatives, in THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF
THERAPEUTICS 102 (5th ed. L. Goodman & A. Gilman 1975). The barbiturates are usually
grouped according to duration and activity. Barbital and phenobarbital (Veronal and Lumi-
nal) are long-acting (six to ten hours), amobarbital (Amytal) is intermediate (five to six
hours) in duration, and pentobarbital and secobarbital (Nembutal and Seconal) are short-
acting (two to three hours). 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 291.
19. In 1864, Adolph von Baeyer first prepared barbituric acid (malonylurea), which is
not a central nervous system depressant. The barbiturates are formed through substitutions
at position five of the malonylurea molecule. In 1903, Fischer and von Mering introduced
the first medically useful barbiturate, diethylbarbituric acid or barbital (Veronal). In 1912,
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nervous system depression caused by barbiturates produces symp-
toms that range from mild sedation to coma and death."0 The
drugs' effect is directly influenced by the user's expectations and
the physical or social setting in which the drug is ingested.2 1 For
instance, a dose of 220 mg. of secobarbital may induce either sleep
or a state of disinhibition euphoria depending upon the individ-
ual's mental state and his environment.2 2 Short duration barbitu-
rates produce a barbiturate "high" that is very similar to alcohol
intoxication; 3 higher doses produce coma and death.2 4 All barbitu-
rates produce an effect known as a barbiturate "hangover" that is
characterized by depressed mood and slowed muscular perform-
ance lasting up to eighteen hours after the drug is ingested. 3 If the
drug is taken in conjunction with alcohol, there is an additive ef-
fect26 that may precipitate death by respiratory failure. The effects
of chronic barbiturate use closely resemble those of chronic alcohol
use and include disorientation, mental confusion, and depression. 7
Abrupt withdrawal of barbiturates from dependent users results in
a psychosis that clinically resembles alcoholic delirium tremens .2
The psychosis, characterized by confusion, disorientation to time
and place, delusions, and visual and auditory hallucinations, is fol-
lowed by a deep sleep.2
Loewe, Juliusberger, and Impens independently and simultaneously introduced phenobarbi-
tal (Luminal) into medicine. Although many other barbiturates have been synthesized, bar-
bital and phenobarbital still are used in medical practice. Harvey, supra note 18.
20. E. BASSUK & S. SCHOONOVER, THE PRACTIONER'S GUIDE TO PSYCHO-ACTIVE DRUGS
147 (1977).
21. R. JULIEN, A PRIMER OF DRUG ACTION 52 (1975).
22. D. WESSON & D. SMITH, BARBrrURATES: THEIR USE, MISUSE, AND ABUSE 28 (1977).
In one study, researchers reported that a group of violent youthful offenders attributed their
aggressive activities to an attempt to counter the depressive effects of barbiturates. They
literally fought to stay awake. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 293.
23. E. BASSUK & S. SCHOONOVER, supra note 20, at 148. As with alcohol intoxication,
there is a reduction in the ability to make accurate judgments and motor control is de-
creased. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 65.
24. E. BASSUK & S. SCHOONOVER, supra note 20.
25. W. EVANS & J. COLE, YOUR MEDICINE CHEST 53 (1978). The barbiturate "hang-
over," however, does not include the nausea and headache of the alcohol hangover. Id.
26. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 1083 (34th ed. 1980). When the combined effect of
two drugs is the simple algebraic sum of their individual actions, there is an "additive"
effect. C. KORNETSKY, supra note 2, at 16.
27. MARTINDALE: THE EXTRA PHARMACOPOEA 770 (27th ed. A. Wade 1977) [hereinafter
cited as MARTINDALE].
28. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 293.
29. Id.
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2. Chloral Hydrate
Chloral hydrate was first synthesized in 1832 and is the oldest
member of the hypnotic group of drugs.30 Its effects are similar to
those of barbiturates, and in therapeutic doses it produces a sound
sleep.3 1 Adverse effects include nightmares, disorientation, and
paranoid behavior.32 As with chronic use of barbiturates or alcohol,
addiction may develop, and sudden withdrawal may result in delir-
ium.u Simultaneous administration of alcohol or barbiturates en-
hances the sedative effects of the drug.3 4
3. Glutethimide
Glutethimide (Doriden) was introduced in 1954 as a "safe"
barbiturate substitute without the potential of addiction. 5 Within
ten years, however, this characterization proved to be incor-
rect-the potential of addiction and severity of withdrawal symp-
toms were shown to be equal to those of barbiturates.3 6 Further-
more, long-acting effects of glutethimide, which make it
exceptionally difficult to reverse an overdose, negated the drug's
potential as a barbiturate substitute. 7
4. Ethyl Alcohol
Because alcohol is a chemical that alters normal biological
processes, it is properly classified as a drug." Alcohol depresses the
central nervous system (CNS), and its effect is in direct proportion
to the level of alcohol in the blood.3' The drug first affects those
30. Harvey, supra note 18, at 126-27.
31. MARTINDALE, supra note 27, at 753.
32. Harvey, supra note 18, at 128.
33. Id.
34. MARTINDALE, supra note 27, at 753.
35. DRUG ENFORCEMENT, July 1979, at 22.
36. Harvey, supra note 18, at 133.
37. Id.; DRUG ENFORCEMENT, July 1979, at 22.
38. R. FORNEY & F. HUGHES, COMBINED EFFECTS OF ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUGS 6
(1968).
39. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 144. Ray summarizes the behavioral effects expected in
moderate drinkers at particular blood alcohol percentages: 0.05-lowered alertness, usually
good feeling, release of inhibitions, impaired judgment; 0.10-slowed reaction times and im-
paired motor function, less caution; 0.15-large, consistent increases in reaction time;
0.20-marked depression in sensory and motor capability, decidely intoxicated; 0.25-severe
motor disturbance, staggering, sensory perceptions greatly impaired, smashed; 0.30-stupor-
ous but conscious-no comprehension of the world around them; 0.35--surgical anesthesia,
about LD-1, minimal level causing death; 0.40-about LD-50. Id. at 146. Blood levels, how-
ever, do not explain all behavioral effects. Other factors, including the ethnic origin of the
1149
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parts of the brain involved in the most highly integrated func-
tions.40 Release of the cortex from its integrating and inhibitory
control results in disorganized thought processes and disruption of
motor control.41 Recent memory, ability to concentrate, and dis-
crimination are diminished.42 Depending on the history of the par-
ticular individual, behaviors that were previously suppressed may
be released.43 In this initial period, users often become more loqua-
cious, extroverted, confident, and aggressive, but mood swings are
uncontrolled and emotional outbursts are frequent." The user
feels that his performance in both verbal and manual tasks is en-
hanced, but tests show -that efficiency in such tasks is decreased.4 5
Consequently, the capacity for prudent judgment is diminished. 6
At higher blood-alcohol levels increased CNS depression may pro-
duce incoordination, confusion, disorientation, stupor, anesthesia,
coma, or death.4 '
Small doses of alcohol may induce a sudden, brief, and
profound intoxication in some individuals who have poor impulse
control and chronic anxiety.48 This pathological intoxication is
characterized by confusion, disorientation, delusions, visual hallu-
cinations, increased activity, impulsivity, aggressiveness, and rage
reactions.49 The episode ends with a deep sleep, and usually the
person does not remember the event when he awakens.50
A few chronic alcoholics experience a disintegration of person-
ality structure, and in such cases episodic loss of control is fre-
quent.51 A syndrome closely resembling schizophrenia, with para-
noid delusions and hallucinations, is evident in some alcoholics. 2
An acute alcoholic hallucinosis, consisting of illusions, auditory and
olfactory hallucinations, and paranoia, may follow an alcoholic's
drinker, his social environment, and his expectations, contribute to the degree of intoxica-
tion. R. FORNEY & F. HUGHES, supra note 38, at 31.
40. Ritchie, The Aliphatic Alcohols, in THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS
137-38 (5th ed. L. Goodman & A. Gilman 1975).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. W. CLARK & J. DEL GIUDICE, PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 510 (1970).
44. Id.; Ritchie, supra note 40, at 137-38.
45. E. BASSUK & S. SCHOONOVER, supra note 20, at 267.
46. R. FORNEY & F. HUGHES, supra note 38, at 33.
47. W. CLARK & J. DEL GIUDICE, supra note 43, at 510.
48. E. BASSUK & S. SCHOONOVER, supra note 20, at 268.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 269.
51. Id.
52. Id.
1150 [Vol. 33:1145
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prolonged period of drinking. In contrast with the experience of
delirium tremens, however, there is excellent memory of the
psychotic episode.5 3 Nevertheless, memory may be impaired
through the phenomenon of alcohol-induced "blackouts."' 54 In one
laboratory experiment, sober alcoholics were unable to recall con-
versations they had engaged in while intoxicated.55
Alcohol is an addictive drug with chronic ingestion producing
a state of physical dependence.5 6 Degree and duration of intoxica-
tion determine the intensity of a withdrawal syndrome,57 which
may range from a mild hangover to delirium tremens.58 The latter
syndrome occurs in only five percent of alcoholics developing with-
drawal symptoms.59 The initial state of withdrawal is characterized
by restlessness, irritability, and tremor followed by a fitful sleep.
The next stage includes illusions, visual and tactile hallucinations,
and disorientation as to time and place.60 By the third day of with-
drawal, the alcoholic may become terrified of his hallucinations
and experience severe delirium. 1
Mixing alcohol and other drugs may result in additive depres-
sant effects.2 This group of drugs includes barbiturates, CNS de-
pressants, narcotics, phenothiazines, sedatives and hypnotics, and
tricyclic antidepressants.6"
5. Methaqualone
Methaqualone, an addictive, nonbarbiturate sedative-hyp-
notic, was introduced in the United States in 1965 under the brand
names Quaalude and Sopor." Except for a greater loss of motor
coordination, the effects of the drug are similar to those of other
sedative-hypnotics.6 5 A "high" or "down" may result from mild
overdosage.6 With severe overdosage, delirium and convulsions
53. Id. at 268.
54. H. WALLGREN & H. BARRY, 1 ACTIONS OF ALCOHOL 342 (1970).
55. Id.
56. C. KORNETSKY, supra note 2, at 155-56.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. E. BASSUK & S. SCHOONOVER, supra note 20, at 271-72.
60. Id.
61. C. KORNETsKY, supra note 2.
62. J. JAMES, M. BRAUNSTEIN, A. KARIG, E. HARTSHORN, A GUIDE TO DRUG INTERAC-
TIONS 11 (1978).
63. Id.
64. 0. RAY, supra note 18, at 289.
65. Id. at 290.
66. Harvey, supra note 18, at 131.
1980] 1151
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
may occur, 7 and in one reported case a dose of 400 mg. produced
amnesia.6 8 A popular view among abusers of the drug is that it is
an aphrodisiac. Members of the drug culture also liken the effects
of the drug to those of heroin.6'
C. Hallucinogens
From a clinical perspective there is no clear dividing line be-
tween hallucinogens and other drugs. In toxic doses or under cer-
tain conditions, many drugs can induce hallucinations, illusions,
delusions, and paranoid ideation.7 0 Legal terminology arbitrarily
defines as hallucinogenic lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and re-
lated drugs that produce states of altered perception.7 1 Although
the pharmacological and physiological bases of hallucinogenic po-
tency remain a scientific puzzle,72 the actual effects upon man have
been explored. 78
1. LSD
LSD was first synthesized from ergot fungus in 1938;74 its hal-
lucinogenic properties were discovered in 1943.75 Prior to 1962,
LSD was little known and available only on a small scale. In 1962,
however, new restrictive Federal Drug Administration regulations
led to a substantial increase in illegal private manufacture of LSD.
The widespread public controversy over the drug served to publi-
cize and launch its greater use.7
LSD is a potent compound7 without odor, color or taste.78
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Jaffe, Drug Addiction and Drug Abuse, in Tim PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERA-
PEUTCS 309 (5th ed. L. Goodman & A. Gilman 1975).
71. Id.
72. Brawley & Dufflield, The Pharmacology of Hallucinogens, in 24 PHARMACOL. REVS.
31 (1972).
73. R. DEBOLD & R. LEAF, LSD, MAN AND SocIETy (1958).
74. Known for centuries in Europe, Ergot fungus (Claviceps purpurea) grows on
grain. The fungus is easily detectable, and the grain is usually destroyed, since the ergot
remains active in bread made from contaminated grain. LSD was synthesized from ergot by
A. Hofmann at Sandoz Laboratories, Switzerland. For further ergot information, see E.
BRECHER, supra note 7, at 346.
75. Hoffmdn, Psychotomimetic Drugs: Chemical & Pharmacological Aspects, 8 ACTA
PHYSIOLOGICA ET PHARMACOLOGiCA NERLANDICA 240 (1959).
76. E. BRECRER, supra note 7, at 366.
77. Doses as low as .03 milligram have been found effective, while the usual dose is .05
milligram. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 350.
78. Id. at 356.
1152 [Vol. 33:1145
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Readily absorbed when taken orally, the drug produces initial sen-
sations in twenty to eighty minutes depending upon dosage and
individual sensitivity.79 The physiological effects of LSD usually
consist of pupillary dilation, piloerection (gooseflesh), tachycardia
(accelerated heart rate), muscular weakness, tremor, nausea,
numbness, and hyperthermia. s° Other possible reactions include
hallucinatory effects and distortions in sensory perception s' and
hypersensitivity to stimuli.82 In addition, synesthesias, the overflow
from one sense to another, may occur,83 along with space and time
disorders and abnormal body sensations.8 4 Amphetamines and
stimulants prolong and intensify the effects of LSD, while paren-
teral barbiturates abort the action.85
Continued use of LSD rapidly produces tolerance and requires
a greater dose to achieve equivalent prior effects.88 If LSD usage is
interrupted, however, tolerance vanishes quickly,8 7 allowing re-
sumption of drug intake at smaller doses within a few days. No
physical withdrawal symptoms result when drug use is discontin-
ued.8 LSD is cross-tolerant with mescaline and psilocybin. A toler-
ance developed to one drug also produces a tolerance to the
others.89 Although accurate data on long-term use of LSD are diffi-
cult to obtain, studies appear to rule out major brain damage even
after hundreds of "trips."90 It is also asserted that "[d]eath directly
79. W. CLARK & J. DEL GIUDICE, supra note 43, at 490.
80. Id. at 493; C. KORNETSKY, supra note 2, at 207.
81. D. SANKAR, LSD-A ToTAL STuDY 287 (1975). Sankar adopts a four-stage view of
the effects of LSD: (1) Initial-lasting for an hour, in which the somatic effects occur, see
note 80 supra, and accompanying text; (2) Experience-lasting one to eight hours, in which
the psychedelic effects occur; (3) Recovery-lasting from hours to several days, when normal
condition alternates with abnormal; (4) Aftermath-either immediate, resulting in tension,
anxiety, depression or fatigue, or long-term. Sankar cites flashbacks as a long-term effect,
but it has never been proven that flashbacks differ from any recurrent memory of an intense
emotional experience. Id. at 287-88. For a discussion of flashbacks, see E. BRECHER, supra
note 7, at 378-79.
82. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 357.
83. Jaffe, supra note 70, at 310. Colors are heard and sounds may be seen.
84. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 359.
85. W. CLARK & J. DEL Giunicz, supra note 43, at 491. Chlorpromazine is usually the
drug of choice to block LSD. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 356-57.
86. Continued use of LSD over a period of three (3) days may produce tolerance. C.
KORNrSKy, supra note 2, at 207.
87. Id.
88. Jaffe, supra note 70, at 311.
89. The hallucinogens are similar to the narcotics in the development of cross-toler-
ances. See notes 149-50 infra and accompanying text.
90. E. BRECHER, supra note 7, at 389. The rumors of chromosome damage by LSD
have also proved unfounded. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 366.
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caused by the toxicity of LSD is unknown. ' 91
The psychological effects of LSD are numerous and vary
widely among individuals. "It is not possible to say, 'This is the
description of the experience.' ,,92 Studies indicate that individual
reaction depends upon the complex interaction of several variables.
The most important are setting, personality, dose, and expecta-
tion.93 LSD can increase self-awareness and release inhibition. De-
pending upon the variables, this release may be "ecstatic, frighten-
ing, rapturous or homicidal."94 In the second hour after ingestion,
fear of fragmentation of the self may cause ego disruptions includ-
ing depersonalization, loss of self-awareness, and loss of control
over behavior.9 5 Tension and anxiety may produce panic or overt
psychosis.
Although no method exists to insure a "good" experience, the
environment is a useful predictive indicator.9 6 Supportive compan-
ions and a structured physical setting usually act to prevent a
panic reaction. The pre-existing personality of an individual can
indicate whether the use of LSD will lead to overt psychosis,'97 for
the individual with an already precarious hold on reality will be
unable to integrate the LSD experience. Dose level contributes to
the severity of effects-low doses give rise to mild to severe distor-
tions, larger doses result in pseudo-hallucinations, and very large
doses lead to true hallucinations.9 Although an individual may
have the ability to cope with distortion, true hallucinations may
cause him to panic. Expectation is a further component in the LSD
experience. Statistics indicate that the incidence of "bad trips" ex-
panded at a greater rate after LSD received large amounts of ad-
verse publicity,99 because of increased expectation of adverse ef-
91. W. CLARK & J. Dms GIUDIcE, supra note 43, at 497.
92. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 359.
93. W. CLARK & J. DEL GIUDICE, supra note 43, at 495.
94. D. SANKAR, supra note 81, at 340.
95. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 359.
96. W. CLARK & J. DEL GIUDICE, supra note 43, at 377, find that subjective reactions
alter with the environment. "[B]oth social and physical aspects of the environment may
interact with drug effects. . . to produce unanticipated, yet predictable results." Id.
97. Although there is difference of opinion over whether novices have more serious
reactions than habitual users, "it is probably true that the more disturbed one is in the
absence of the drug, the more likely it is that one will have a bad trip or other adverse
reaction." 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 362.
98. Gorodetsky, Marihuana, LSD, and Amphetamines, 5 DRUG DEPENDENcE 20
(1970). Often LSD is bought in an unknown amount and can trigger a panic reaction
through an unexpectedly large dosage. E. BRECHER, supra note 7, at 375.
99. Id.
1154 [Vol. 33:1145
SPECIAL PROJECT: DRUGS
fects. Thus, initial apprehension may lead to a self-fulfilling
prophecy and increase the hazards of LSD use.
2. Psilocybin
The drug psilocybin is found naturally in Psilocybe mexicana
and related mushrooms, 100 commonly called "magic mushrooms."
When manufactured synthetically, the drug is known as psilocin.
Also an alkaloid, psilocybin's physiological and psychological ef-
fects are similar to those of LSD.'01
Two primary differences distinguish psilocybin from LSD.
First, it is estimated that LSD is at least 100 times more potent
than psilocybin.110 In addition, psilocybin, which produces effects
for only two to six hours, has a shorter period of activity than
LSD.108
3. DMT
Another alkaloid with psychedelic effect similar to LSD is
dimethyltryptamine (DMT), which is closely related to the less
common diethyltryptamine (DET). Unlike LSD, DMT is not effec-
tive when taken orally and therefore must be injected or inhaled
by sniffing or smoking.10 4 DMT produces an LSD-like syndrome of
very short duration accompanied by more severe sympathomimetic
actions.10 5 An injected dose of one milligram per kilogram of body
weight produces LSD-like effects for approximately one hour.06
4. DOM-STP
The drug 2,5-dimethoxy-4-methylamphetamine (DOM), is
commonly known as STP. On the "street" these initials are said to
stand for "Serendipity, Tranquility and Peace.110 7 There have
been few experiments with DOM in controlled laboratory situa-
tions. The data gathered thus far indicate that the actions and ef-
fects of DOM are similar to LSD and mescaline.108 DOM has a rep-
100. C. KORNTSKY, supra note 2, at 208.
101. Jaffe, supra note 70, at 310.
102. Id.
103. W. CLARK & J. DEL GIUDICE, supra note 43, at 499.
104. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 374.
105. C. KORMUESKY, supra note 2, at 209.
106. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 374. The experience is short enough to fit into a lunch
hour; thus the DMT characterization as the "businessman's trip."
107. C. KORmNrSKY, supra note 2, at 209.
108. DOM is one hundred times as potent as mescaline, but only 1/13 as potent as
19801 1155
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utation of producing extraordinarily long effects, lasting from 24 to
48 hours. This reputation may result from street exaggeration, or
the effects may actually be caused by the use of large amounts.1°9
Low doses of DOM produce euphoria without causing psychedelic
effects or perceptual distortions."' Higher doses produce typical
LSD-like psychedelic effects.'
D. Marijuana, Hashish, and THC
Marijuana112 is a preparation for smoking that consists of the
chopped leaves, flowers, and stems of the Cannabis plant.13 The
psychoactive substance believed responsible for most of the char-
acteristic psychological effects of marijuana is Delta-9 tetrahydro-
cannabinol (THC)."4 The actual amount of THC found in mari-
juana depends upon the conditions of harvesting and curing and
the genetic variation of the plant.1 1 5 The resin of the plant is se-
creted in the highest quantity by the unfertilized flowers of the
female and contains five to ten times as much THC as is found in
the leaves. 1 6 In the United States, "hashish"" 7 refers to the highly
resinous concentrate from the flowering tops of the female plant.11 8
Hash oil, containing still higher concentrations of THC, is made by
boiling hash in a solvent and filtering out the solid material.'19
Behavioral responses to THC vary according to strength of the
preparation, route of administration, setting, and individual vari-
ables such as metabolic rate and experience and expectations of
LSD. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 381.
109. Id.
110. Snyder, Faillace & Weingartner, DOM (STP), a New Hallucinogenic Drug, and
DOET: Effects in Normal Subjects, 125 AM. J. PSYCH. 358 (1968).
111. One to three milligrams produce only euphoria, while three to five milligrams
produce a six- to eight-hour hallucinogenic period. 0. RAY, supra, note 8, at 381.
112. Slang terms for marijuana include "Acapulco Gold," "Cannabis," "Colombian,"
"Gangs," "Grass," "Griffa," .'Hemp," "Herb," "'J," "Jay, .... Joint, ....Mary Jane," "Mota,"
"Mutah," "Panama Red," "Pot," "Reefer," "Sativa," "Smoke," "Stick," "Tea," "Weed,"
and "Yerba." DRUG ENFORCEMENT, July 1979, at 39.
113. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 401. The evidence is strong that there are three species
of Cannabis: Cannabis sativa, from which hemp rope is made, Cannabis indica, which is
grown for its psychoactive resins, and Cannabis ruderalis, which grows primarily in Russia
and not at all in the United States. Id. at 391.
114. Jaffe, supra note 70, at 306.
115. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 401.
116. Id.
117. Slang terms for hashish include "Goma de Mote," "Hash," and "Soles." DRUG
ENFORCEMENT, July 1979, at 39.
118. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 401.
119. Id. at 391-92.
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subjects."' 0 While the THC "high" varies greatly with individu-
als,12 I the most common effects can be described. In low doses, 22
equivalent to one marijuana cigarette, THC usually produces an
increased sense of well-being or euphoria12 3 that relieves pre-ex-
isting tension, anxiety, and hostility.1 24 The euphoric feeling is ac-
companied by psychosedative effects, which include sleepiness,1 25
sluggishness, lethargy, fuzzy thinking, 28 an altered time sense,2
and a dreamy state in which the user is less able to communi-
cate.12 8 At slightly higher doses, equivalent to several marijuana
cigarettes, short-term memory is often impaired, but long-term
memory remains intact. " As a consequence, there may be a dete-
rioration in the capacity to carry out tasks requiring multiple
mental steps.130 Users also report a keener sense of hearing, more
vivid visual imagery,131 and an enhancement of the nondominant
senses of touch, taste, and smell. 18 2 Although the user's senses ap-
pear heightened, there is a dose-related impairment of intellectual
and psychomotor performance at the level of social intoxication.133
Adverse reactions to THC are uncommon, but may occur at
high dosage levels. 34 The most common reaction is panic resulting
from the fear of loss of control.135 Acute intoxication may produce
120. E. BASSUK & S. SCHOONOVER, supra note 20, at 296.
121. C. KORNETSKY, supra note 2, at 215.
122. In the United States, an average marijuana cigarette delivers the equivalent of 2.5
to 5 mg of Delta-9 THC. Jaffe, supra note 70.
123. Id.
124. E. BASSUK & S. SCHOONOVER, supra note 20.
125. Sleepiness is more pronounced when users are alone than when they interact with
others. Jaffe, supra note 70.
126. Thought processes are slowed, and concentration is impaired. E. BASSUK & S.
SCHOONOVER, supra note 20.
127. Time appears to pass more slowly. "Minutes may seem like hours." Jaffe, supra
note 70, at 307.
128. "Speech may be disconnected and tangential." E. BASSUK & S. SCHOONOVER,
supra note 20.
129. Id.
130. "This effect on memory-dependent, goal-directed behavior has been called 'tem-
poral disintegration,' and is correlated with a tendency to confuse past, present, and future,
and with depersonalization-a sense of strangeness and unreality about the self." Jaffe,
supra note 20, at 306.
131. Visual and auditory stimuli previously ignored may take on a novel quality. Id. at
307.
132. Id.
133. E. BASSUK & S. SCHOONOVER, supra note 20, at 297. Experienced users, however,
are able to compensate for the acute intoxicating effects, even when given large doses of
THC. Id.
134. Id.
135. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 408. Panic reactions tend to occur in older and inexperi-
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a THC-precipitated psychosis 3 6 that is clinically indistinguishable
from a schizophrenic reaction'8 7 and is characterized by confusion,
paranoia, and visual and auditory hallucinations.3 8 Furthermore,
investigators have reported the occurrence of "flashbacks"' 1 9 that
resemble an LSD intoxication of shorter duration and less
intensity. 4 '
E. Narcotics
Narcotic agents are either extracted from the opium poppy 41
or are derived synthetically from morphine-like alkaloids. 42
Opium is produced by incising the seed capsule of the poppy and
collecting, drying, and powdering the oxidized sap from the
wound. 43 Opium contains over twenty alkaloids; the two producing
narcotic effects are morphine (10%) and codeine (0.5%).144 There
are four classes of narcotic agents: the natural opium alkaloids; the
semisynthetic derivatives; the synthetic agents (opioids); and the
narcotic antagonists. 45
1. Effects of Narcotics
In considering the effects of narcotics, it is important to note
that all opiate agonists are generally fungible. 46 Continual use of a
narcotic rapidly produces tolerance, 47 and requires an increase in
dosage to produce prior effects. Narcotic use induces drug depen-
dence (addiction), which is characterized by tolerance, physical de-
enced users. E. BASSUK & S. SCHOONOVER, supra note 20, at 297.
136. E. BASSUK & S. SCHOONOVER, supra note 20, at 298.
137. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 408.
138. E. BASSUK & S. SCHOONOVER, supra note 20, at 299.
139. Keeler, Reifler & Liptzin, Spontaneous Recurrence of Marihuana Effect, 125 Am.
J. PsYcH. 384 (1968).
140. E. BASSUK & S. SCHOONOVER, supra note 20, at 298.
141. The opium poppy, Papaver somniferum, is indigenous to Asia Minor. Jaffe &
Martin, Narcotic Analgesics and Antagonists, in THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERA-
PEUTICS 245 (5th ed. L. Goodman & A. Gilman, 1975).
142. The perspective here is medical; the legal definition of narcotics is based upon
the addictive nature of the drugs. Legally, cocaine is also classified as a narcotic. R. FORNEY
& F. HUGHES, supra note 38, at 73.
143. C. KORNETSKY, supra note 2, at 117.
144. M. GERALD, supra note 14, at 241.
145. Id. at 237-38.
146. The opiate agonists are the natural opium alkaloids, the semisynthetic deriva-
tives, and the synthetic agents. Since all narcotics are based on morphine and codeine alka-
loids, the differences in effect are generally of degree, not of kind, and are considered at
Subsection 2 infra.
147. C. KORNETSKY, supra note 2, at 130.
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pendence, and compulsive abuse (psychic craving).' 48 The use of
one narcotic induces cross-tolerance 4 9 and cross-dependence150
among all opiate agonists. Once drug dependence is established,
cessation of drug use produces withdrawal; the severity of that var-
ies according to the degree of physical dependence, which is deter-
mined by the dosage at the time of abstinence. 151
Narcotic use produces a variety of physiological effects. The
pupils constrict, decreasing the ability to see in the dark. 52 A de-
crease in motility of the gastrointestinal tract leads to constipa-
tion. 5 s In addition, interaction with the CNS results in vasodiala-
tion (elevated body heat), decrease in salivation, and histamine
release causing itching in the extremities.5 4 Sexual function is de-
pressed. Narcotics stimulate the brain area controlling nausea and
vomiting, 15 but depress the respiratory centers in the brain, which
results in slow, shallow respiration. 5 6
The primary psychophysiological effect of narcotics is an anal-
gesic action that provides relief from severe pain. These drugs,
however, inhibit only the subjective, anxiety-provoking aspect of
pain and not the perception of pain itself. 5 7 Initial use of narcotics
in the absence of pain produces dysphoria, 58 but persistent admin-
148. A. GOLDSTEIN, L. ARONOW & S. KALmAN, PRINCIPLES OF DRUG ACTION 586 (2d ed.
1974).
149. E. BRECHER, supra note 7, at 2.
150. "The ability of one drug to suppress the manifestations of physical dependence
produced by another and to maintain the physically dependent state is referred to as cross-
dependence." Jaffe, supra note 70, at 289-90.
151. Administering a narcotic at any time will immediately stop withdrawal symp-
toms. The symptoms initially resemble those of influenza and usually appear eight to twelve
hours after the last dose:
The addict experiences tearing, a runny nose, sweating, yawning, and difficulty in
sleeping. This restless sleep is commonly referred to as the "yen." At about 20 hours,
goose flesh (hence the name "cold turkey"), widened pupils, and tremors appear. At the
peak intensity of withdrawal (about 48 to 72 hours), the addict suffers from insomnia,
weakness, muscle spasms in the legs, chills, intestinal cramps, nausea, vomiting, diar-
rhea, fever, and an elevated blood pressure; in very severe cases, he may suffer from
hallucinations and become delirious.
M. GERALD, supra note 14, at 251. There is no medical evidence that withdrawal alone is
fatal. Id.
152. E. BRECHER, supra note 7, at 31. Miosis reduces the pupil to a "pinpoint." Toler-
ance never develops to this narcotic effect. C. KORNETSKY, supra note 2, at 127-28.
153. Id. at 129.
154. Jaffe & Martin, supra note 141, at 247.
155. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 311.
156. Id.
157. C. KORNETSKY, supra note 2, at 121-22.
158. DeLong, supra note 5, at 78. Dysphoria is the experience of mild anxiety and
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istration results in a euphoric experience. When taken intrave-
nously, a narcotic such as heroin has two discernable stages of ef-
fects-the "rush" or initial impact, often likened to sexual orgasm
and the "high," a state when the drug acts as an emotional analge-
sic.159 If a narcotic is not administered intravenously, only the sec-
ond stage euphoria is experienced. During the euphoric state the
opiates cause a mental clouding characterized by drowsiness, leth-
argy, and an inability to concentrate. 00 "Opioids reduce pain, ag-
gression, and sexual drives, and their use, therefore, is unlikely to
induce crime."1 61 Violent action is unlikely because the euphoric
user is "often totally disinterested in the outside world and its
activities. ''1 62
If the social, economic, and legal consequences of illicit nar-
cotic use were not punitive, research indicates that little harm
would result.16 s Evidence suggests that the drugs temporarily de-
press rather than permanently damage sexual function,' and con-
trolled tests show no intellectual deterioration due to drug use.16
Narcotics do not cause either chronic psychosis or an organic type
of mental deterioration. 166 One study found no "physical deteriora-
tion or impairment of physical fitness aside from addiction per se
[and] no evidence of change in the circulatory, hepatic, renal or
endocrine functions. '1 67
An inherent danger of illicit narcotic use is the potential for
overdose because of the uncertainty of the drug's strength. A user
who has temporarily ceased drug intake to lower drug tolerance,
and thus cost of habit, may be unable to gauge the new level of
tolerance. As dosage is increased, the subjective effects of the drug
are more pronounced; there is greater drowsiness, euphoria, nau-
sea, vomiting, and respiratory depression.6 s Excessive doses in-
duce convulsions and respiratory arrest. Overdose is a slow death,
often taking up to twelve hours and characterized by lethargy and
159. Id. at 79.
160. Id. at 78-79.
161. Jaffe, supra note 70, at 295.
162. M. GERALD, supra note 14, at 250.
163. E. BRECHER, supra note 7, at 27. "There is thus general agreement throughout
the medical and psychiatric literature that the overall effects of opium, morphine, and her-
oin on the addict's mind and body under conditions of low price and ready availability are
on the whole amazingly bland." Id.
164. Id. at 29.
165. Id. at 25.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 23.
168. Jaffe & Martin, supra note 141, at 248.
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stupor followed by coma and then respiratory arrest."6 9 The nar-
cotic antagonists, acting as an antidote for respiratory depression,
are used to counteract an overdose. 17 1
2. Representative Narcotic Antagonists
(a) Opium
Opium has been used for its pleasurable and analgesic effects
since the Sumerians in 4000 B.C.171 The drug is primarily pre-
scribed in capsule form to treat diarrhea. To obtain euphoric ef-
fects, opium vapor containing morphine must be inhaled. 72 Opium
differs from other narcotic drugs in dosage: to equal one grain of
injected heroin, 300-400 grains of opium must be smoked. In addi-
tion, inhalation spreads the dose over time, as opposed to instanta-
neous introduction through injection. 7 3
(b) Morphine
Morphine is often the standard of comparison for other nar-
cotics. First isolated from opium in 1803, 4 morphine is highly ef-
fective for the relief of severe pain and as an antitussive. 5 When
taken subcutaneously, the peak effect of the drug occurs within 30
minutes to an hour and lasts four to six hours.17 6 The decline from
peak effect is rapid and necessitates readministration to avoid an
abrupt mood change from euphoria to depression. When taken
orally, the peak effect is lower and delayed, but the effects last
from twelve to twenty-four hours.
17 7
(c) Codeine
Codeine, or methylmorphine, is less effective than morphine as
an analgesic or antitussive. 7 8 The drug is often taken orally with
tolerance developing less rapidly than with morphine. The drug
169. E. BRECHER, supra note 7, at 102.
170. M. GERALD, supra note 14, at 237. The most common narcotic antagonists are
nalorphine, naloxone and levallorphan.
171. Id. at 239.
172. E. BRECHER, supra note 7, at 46.
173. Id.
174. A German pharmacist named Sertfirner isolated morphine. The name was de-
rived from Morpheus, Greek god of dreams. C. KORNETSKY, supra note 2, at 118.
175. M. GERALD, supra note 14, at 237. An antitussive is a cough suppressant.
176. C. KORNETSKY, supra note 2, at 121.
177. DeLong, supra note 5, at 77.
178. M. GERALD, supra note 14, at 237. Codeine is still extensively used as an antitus-
sive and for relief of mild pain.
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produces less respiratory and behavioral depression, and codeine
use is characterized by a lower incidence of nausea and
constipation. 79
(d) Heroin
Heroin (diacetylmorphine) is a semisynthetic derivative of
morphine. s0 First discovered in 1898, it has become the most
popularly abused narcotic. Although heroin is three times as active
as morphine, it produces no greater dependence, no different eu-
phoria, and no fewer side effects.18' Heroin's potency stems from
its ability to pass through the blood-brain barrier, where it is hy-
drolyzed to morphine. 8
(e) Dilaudid
Hydromorphone, or dihydromorphinone, is another semisyn-
thetic derivative and is commonly known by its trade name Dilau-
did. This drug is ten times as active as morphine and produces
proportionately greater respiratory depression. Dilaudid has a
faster onset and a shorter duration of action than morphine."8 "
(f) Meperidine
Meperidine, a synthetic agent, is known under the trade
names Demerol and Dolantin and is one of the most commonly
used narcotic analgesics. Unlike morphine, meperidine has no anti-
tussive action, does not produce contraction of the pupils, and has
slight constipating effects.'" Meperidine is one-tenth as potent as
morphine'85 and has a shorter duration of action-two to four
hours.'86 With oral administration, the meperidine peak effect is
fifty percent higher than with intravenous administration.' 87
179. Id. at 256.
180. C. KORNETSKY, supra note 2, at 119.
181. If heroin is administered subcutaneously, users cannot reliably distinguish heroin
from morphine. Jaffe, supra note 70, at 294.
182. M. GERALD, supra note 14, at 247.
183. Id. at 237.
184. C. KORNwTSKY, supra note 2, at 132.
185. M. GERALD, supra note 14, at 248.
186. Jaffe & Martin, supra note 141, at 264.
187. DeLong, supra note 5, at 78. The study found that "addicted medical personnel,
who have ready access to meperidine, tend to prefer that drug to the other opiates, possibly
because of its fast action and relatively high potency when taken orally." Id.
1162 * [Vol. 33:1145
SPECIAL PROJECT: DRUGS
(g) Methadone
Methadone is an addictive synthetic analgesic agent. Equally
potent as morphine, methadone has a longer duration of action.188
Several effects distinguish methadone from morphine. First, it pro-
duces no euphoria when taken orally. Second, it prevents an emo-
tional bounce from euphoria to depression because of its long ac-
tivity. Third, it eliminates tolerance problems because of its
stabilized dosage. Fourth, it blocks the euphoric effects of mor-
phine. Fifth, it ends compulsive drug-seeking behavior. Last, it re-
sults in less severe withdrawal symptoms.18 Because of these fac-
tors, methadone has become the drug of choice for treatment of
narcotic dependence.
F. PCP
Marketed as Sernylan, phencyclidine (PCP) is classified as an
anesthetic agent and is used only in veterinary medicine. 190 PCP is
a white crystalline powder soluble in water and alcohol' 91 and is
commonly manufactured in capsule or tablet form. The drug may
be smoked, inhaled, swallowed, or injected.
PCP is a difficult drug to classify because it produces different
effects at different doses. The drug's action on the brain is not
well understood by the medical profession. 92 At different dose
levels PCP acts as a minor tranquilizer, sedative, analgesic, anes-
thetic or stimulant; when injected intravenously, it produces hallu-
cinations.193 The drug slightly increases pulse and breathing rates,
but produces a more noticeable increase in blood pressure. 94 In
addition, there may be loss of muscular coordination, unsteady
gait, nausea, vomiting, and dizziness. 95 Medical literature, how-
ever, indicates that use of the drug does not result in permanent
damage.196
Although PCP produces some hallucinogenic effects similar to
LSD, the "disorganizaton of thought and derealization are greater
188. E. BRECHER, supra note 9, at 161-62.
189. Id. at 161-62.
190. M. GERALD, supra note 14, at 330.
191. Marshman & Adair, Phencyclidine, 18 ADDICTIONs 31-35 (1971).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 384.
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than with LSD. ' 197 Research indicates that PCP mimics the symp-
toms of early schizophrenia better than the other hallucinogens.198
PCP's disorganizing potential may result in anti-social actions and
may produce "inappropriate or dangerous behavior (e.g., reckless
driving or assault) while a person is in a disoriented and possibly
hostile state."199
G. Peyote and Mescaline
Peyote (peyotl),200 a cactus common throughout the Southwest
and Mexico, 0 1 contains more than thirty psychoactive alkaloids.0 2
"Mescal buttons," which are dried slices of the upper portion of
the cactus, contain mescaline, the primary agent responsible for
the visual effects associated with the ingestion of peyote.2 03
Doses of 300 to 500 mg of mescaline are sufficient to produce
hallucinations.2 4 Although the mescaline experience begins about
one hour after oral administration,205 the peak effects are not at-
tained until about two to four hours after ingestion and may not be
completely absent until twelve hours later.20 6 Effects of the drug
include perceptual distortion, heightened sense of color, enhanced
self-awareness, some depersonalization, and a state of heightened
mood. 07 The most prominent effect of the drug consists of visual
hallucinations in rich colors, but there may also be auditory and
tactile hallucinations.2 0 8 The mescaline experience differs from that
of LSD in that it lasts longer, produces more vivid colors and
perceptual phenomena,20 9 and is less likely to induce flagrant
psychotic reactions.10
197. W. CLARK & J. DEL GIuDIcE, supra note 43, at 490.
198. Id.
199. Marshman & Adair, supra note 191, at 384.
200. Slang terms for peyote include "Buttons," "Cactus," "Mesc," "Mescal," and
"Mescal. Buttons." DRUG ENFORCEMENT, July 1979, at 39 (1979).
201. Peyote is the cactus Lophophora williamsii. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 376.
202. Id. at 379.
203. Id.
204. MARTINDALE, supra note 27, at 883.
205. E. BAssuK & S. SCHOONOVER, supra note 20, at 291.
206. W. EVANS & J. COLE, supra note 25, at 292.
207. Id.
208. Schultes, Hallucinogens of Plant Origin, 163 SCIENc E 245, 250 (1969).
209. W. EVANS & J. COLE, supra note 25, at 292.
210. A. GoTH, MEDCAL PHARMACOLOGY 317 (8th ed. 1976).
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H. Psychotherapeutics
1. Tricyclic Antidepressants
Imipramine is representative of the class of psychotherapeutic
drugs known as tricyclic antidepressants.2 " When administered
over a period of time, the tricyclics produce an elevation of mood
in depressed patients.2 12 Normal subjects, however, feel "unhappy"
and are more anxious after being given a therapeutic dose of the
drug.2 13 In certain predisposed patients, tricyclics may induce ma-
nic excitement. 4 Acute overdose produces an adverse reaction
that consists of "confusion, delirium, poor recall, disorientation,
agitation, visual and auditory hallucinations, anxiety, motor rest-
lessness, purposeless movement, and a thought disorder. '215 Con-
comitant use of alcohol may exaggerate these effects. 216
2. Anti-psychotic Drugs: Phenothiazines
Derivatives of phenothiazine, a compound first synthesized in
1883, have been used since the early 1950s in the treatment of
schizophrenia. 21 7 The synthesis in 1950 of the phenothiazine deriv-
ative, chlorpromazine, marked the beginning of a completely new
approach to mental illness.218 Chlorpromazine and the other anti-
psychotic phenothiazines21 9 consistently improve the core symp-
toms of schizophrenia, including emotional withdrawal, hallucina-
211. Imipramine (Tofranil) was the first of the tricyclic series of compounds to be
synthesized (1948). In 1958, Kuhn found that imipramine was effective in the treatment of
mental depression. Byck, Drugs and the Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders, in THE PHAR-
MACOLOGMAL BASIS OF THRAPEUTICS 153, 174 (5th ed. L. Goodman & A. Gilman 1975).
Other tricyclic drugs in current use are desmethylimipramine (Norpramin), amnitriptyline
(Elavil), nortriptyline (Aventyl), and protriptyline (Vivactil). W. EVANS & J. COLE, supra
note 25, at 201.
212. Byck, supra note 211, at 175.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 178.
215. E. BASSUK & S. SCHOONOVER, supra note 20, at 31.
216. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 26, at 910.
217. Byck, supra note 211, at 157.
218. W. CLARK & J. DEL GIuDcE, supra note 43, at 255. Approximately half the pa-
tients in mental hospitals are diagnosed as schizophrenics. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 251.
According to a 1976 report by the Veterans Administration, seventy-four percent of their
then hospitalized psychotic patients received antipsychotic medications. Seventy-eight per-
cent of these patients were receiving a phenothiazine and sixteen percent a butyrophenone.
Id. at 252.
219. Other phenothiazines are triflupromazine (Vespirin), prochlorperazine (Com-
pazine), trifluoperazine (Stelazine), perphenazine (Trilafon), thiopropazate (Dartal), and
Thioridazine (Mellaril). 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 252.
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tions, delusions, paranoia, belligerence, and hostility.22 0 Unlike the
hypnotic drugs, such as barbiturates and alcohol, the phenothi-
azines do not induce any physical dependence or cause any intoxi-
cation or heightening of mood.2 21 If a single oral dose of 100 mg is
given to a normal subject, he will respond minimally to external
stimuli, including those that might arouse emotion during his nor-
mal state.222 Achievement of the same calming effect in a mentally
ill person might require 1000 mg a day.2 While the phenothi-
azines do not cause intoxication or central nervous system depres-
sion, they prolong and intensify the action of CNS depressants
such as anesthetics, barbiturates, and narcotics.224
3. Anti-psychotic Drugs: Butyrophenones
Haloperidol (Haldol),2 a butyrophenone first marketed in the
United States in 1967, is an effective alternative to the anti-
psychotic phenothiazine drugs.226 Although the butyrophenones
differ chemically from the phenothiazines, their effects are quite
similar.2 27 Additive effects result from the use of haloperidol in
combination with alcohol.228 Adverse reactions include insomnia,
restlessness, anxiety, euphoria, agitation, drowsiness, depression,
lethargy, headache, confusion, grand mal seizures, and exacerba-
tion of psychotic symptoms, including hallucinations.229
4. Anti-anxiety Drugs: Meprobamate
Meprobamate (Miltown, Equanil) is a carbamate210 developed
by Berger in 1954.231 Its pharmacological effects are very similar to
those of the barbiturates. 2  At the usual dosage of 400 mg taken
four times a day, the drug causes a mild reduction in anxiety gen-
220. Id. at 254.
221. W. EVANS & J. COLE, supra note 25, at 156.
222. Byck, supra note 211, at 158.
223. W. EVANS & J. COLE, supra note 25, at 154.
224. R. FORNEY & F. HUGHES, COMBiNED EFFECTS OF ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUGS 65
(1968).
225. W. EVANS & J. COLE, supra note 25, at 157.
226. Byck, supra note 211, at 166.
227. W. EVANS & J. COLE, supra note 25, at 157.
228. P'ySIciNS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 26, at 1102.
229. Id.
230. Other carbamates in therapeutic use are tybamate (Tybatran), carisoprodol
(Rela, Soma), mebutamate (Capla), hydroxyphenamate (Listica), and ethinamate (Valmid).
W. EvAs & J. COLE, supra note 25, at 161.
231. Id. at 158-59.
232. Byck, supra note 211, at 188.
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erated by highly emotional situations. s3  A single dose of between
800 and 1600 mg produces an intoxication similar to that associ-
ated with barbiturates.234 Chronic use of meprobamate in high
doses results in tolerance, habituation, and addiction that equals
the severity of barbiturate use. 35 Withdrawal symptoms depend
on the dose and include insomnia, tremors, hallucinations, anxiety,
and grand mal seizures.236 Meprobamate in combination with ei-
ther alcohol or barbiturates has an additive effect.2 37 Adverse reac-
tions to the drug include drowsiness, ataxia, dizziness, slurred
speech, headache, impairment of visual accomodation, euphoria,
overstimulation, and paradoxical excitement.238
5. Anti-anxiety Drugs: Benzodiazepines
The benzodiazepines, of which chloradiazepoxide (Librium) is
representative,3 9 were first synthesized in 1933. At appropriate
doses, these drugs produce calming effects without inducing
sleep.2 40 Their action is of long duration, lasting approximately
twelve to twenty-four hours.2 1
Reported adverse reactions to high doses of these drugs in-
clude an increase in hostility, excitement, psychoses, and rage.242
Benzodiazepines have an additive effect when taken in combina-
tion with ethyl alcohol, barbiturates, and other hypnotic agents.243
6. Lithium
Lithium is an element that is used in its salt form to treat
mania.2  Its specific effect on mania was first reported in 1949,245
233. W. EVANS & J. COLE, supra note 25, at 158-59.
234. Id.
235. E. BASSUK & S. SCHOONOVER, supra note 20, at 150.
236. Id.
237. W. EVANS & J. COLE, supra note 25, at 160.
238. PHYSicINs' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 26, at 1804.
239. Derivatives of chloradiazepoxide used as anti-anxiety agents include diazepam
(Valium), clorazepate dipotassium (Tranxene), and oxazepam (Serax). W. EVANS & J. COLE,
supra note 25, at 161.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 162.
242. Byck, supra note 211, at 191. These effects have not been reported with regard to
oxazepam. Id.
243. E. BASSUK & S. SCHOONOVER, supra note 20, at 141.
244. Byck, supra note 211, at 184. "The core symptoms of mania are an elated mood
and hyperactivity. The manic person feels absolutely marvelous mentally and physically,
but his normal judgments about the world and his own capabilities have disappeared ..
0. RAY, supra note 8, at 261.
245. Byck, supra note 211, at 184.
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but the Food and Drug Administration did not approve its medical
use until 1970.246 In a normal subject, lithium in therapeutic doses
has almost no discernible psychotropic effect.2 47 Instead, the major
problem with lithium therapy is that the dose sufficient to control
the hyper-excitement of mania is very close to the dose that causes
a toxic reaction.48 Consequently, the physician must closely moni-
tor the blood levels of patients at all times during lithium treat-
ment. 49 Symptoms of lithium overdose include fatigue, muscular
weakness, tremor of the hands, slurred speech, blurred vision, diz-
ziness, incoordination, disorientation, apathy, and impaired
memory.250
I. Solvents
A large number of household products are comprised of vola-
tile organic substances: rubber cements and glues contain toluene;
fingernail polish consists of acetone and acetates; lighter and clean-
ing fluids have naphtha and carbon tetrachloride as major constit-
uents; and gasoline contains a variety of hydrocarbons. 25 1 The in-
creased abuse of these products by adolescents252 has focused
attention on the effects of solvents when consumed as a drug.
Solvents are inhaled and gain rapid access to the brain
through the lungs.2 53 "The volatile solvents are properly classified
as anesthetics along with ether and alcohol. Like the latter, they
may produce a temporary period of stimulation before depression
of the central nervous system occurs. ' '2" The early symptoms after
inhalation consist of dizziness, drowsiness, slurred speech, and psy-
chomotor clumsiness.255 The user frequently complains of head-
ache.258 Continued inhalation, once intoxication has occurred, leads
to increased drowsiness, eventual unconsciousness, and death.2 5
246. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 261-62.
247. Byck, supra note 211, at 184.
248. W. EVANS & J. COLE, supra note 25, at 208-09.
249. Id.
250. Id.; E. BAssuK & S. SCHOONOVER, supra note 20, at 60.
251. See M. GERALD, supra note 14, at 195; D. LoURIA, THE DRUG SCENE 46 (1968).
252. For an exposition on how increased publicity created increased solvent abuse, see
E. BRECHER, supra note 7, at 321-34.
253. The solvent is placed in a bag or on a rag, which is then held over the nose and
mouth.
254. Cohen, Glue Sniffing, 231 J.A.M.A. 653, 653 (1975).
255. Id.
256. D. LoURA, supra note 251, at 47.
257. Malcolm, On Solvent Sniffing, in DRUG ABUSE: PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, PHARMA-
COLOGY 455, 456 (B. Hafen ed. 1973).
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Chronic use is characterized by a loss of appetite, anorexia, muscu-
lar weakness, nausea, vomiting, fatigue, and irritation of the nose
and eyes.258 Tolerance occurs when solvent use is habitual, but
there is disagreement as to the degree of physical injury directly
caused by solvent inhalation.2 9 Although it is uncertain whether
solvents create a state of physical dependence, abrupt withdrawal
may produce anxiety, depression, dizziness, aggressive behavior,
restlessness, insomnia, nausea, and compulsive drug craving.260
These symptoms, however, may be psychological rather than phys-
iological in origin.2 61
Solvent inhalation produces a euphoria accompanied by
mental confusion and followed by hallucinations, illusions, or delu-
sions.26 2 The effects of these drugs are unpredictable;2 63 those who
encounter pleasant effects on some occasions may suffer terrifying
264hallucinations during other experiences. A user may feel great
power and strength. "Fighting is a common occurrence, and a snif-
fer may believe that he is immune to injury.' '2 5 While the bulk of
authority reports impulsive, aggressive, and dangerous behav-
iors,266 some commentators perceive these activities as characteris-
tic of immature adolescents who do "all sorts of silly and poten-
tially dangerous things when high on glue-much the same things
they would have done if drunk on alcohol.12 67
J. Stimulants
1. Amphetamines
The amphetamines,2 s consisting of three basic chemical struc-
258. E. BRECHER, supra note 7, at 318.
259. Whether solvent inhalation causes liver damage is an especially controversial is-
sue. Reported blood abnormalities may indicate bone marrow damage. Malcolm, supra note
257, at 456.
260. D. LOURIA, supra note 251, at 50.
261. Malcolm, supra note 257, at 456.
262. Cohen, supra note 254, at 653.
263. See Malcolm, supra note 257, at 456.
264. D. LOURTA, supra note 251, at 48.
265. Malcolm, supra note 257, at 456.
266. See D. LoumA, supra note 251, at 52; Cohen, supra note 254, at 653; Malcolm,
supra note 257, at 456.
267. E. BRECHER, supra note 7, at 331.
268. Slang equivalents for the major types of amphetamines include for dex-
troamphetamine (Dexadrine)---"Dexies," "Co-pilots," and "oranges"; for amphetamine
(Benzedrine)--"Bennies," "Splash," and "Peaches"; for methamphetamine (Methadrine,
Desoxyn)-"Meth," "Speed," "Crystal," "Crank," and "White Cross" (tablets); for dex-
troamphetamine and amphetamine (Diphetamine, Biphetamine)-"Footballs." A. GOTH,
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tures,289  are direct nervous system stimulants.2 70  Therapeutic
doses2171 produce wakefulness, increased mental alertness, improve-
ment in ability to concentrate on simple tasks,272 and euphoria. 73
The drug also improves motor coordination and performance in ac-
tivities that require sustained physical exertion. 4
High doses of amphetamine produce effects that "usually con-
sist of a greater magnitude of its usual pharmacologic actions. 2 7 5
Methamphetamine7 is the drug of choice for euphoric effects. 77
Intravenous injection of "speed" in sufficient quantity may pro-
duce effects similar to whole-body orgasm .27 Acute intoxication is
also characterized by restlessness, irritability, confusion, talkative-
ness, anxiety, insomnia, impotence, changes in libido, profound la-
bility of mood, disorientation, a generalized deterioration in psy-
chomotor performance, and delirium.2 7 9 The intoxication syndrome
may progress to a pattern of psychosis that is often clinically indis-
tinguishable from paranoid schizophrenia28 and includes visual
and auditory hallucinations281 and paranoid delusions."2 The indi-
vidual may become aggressive and antisocial.2 8 Compulsive, stere-
supra note 210, at 310. Other slang terms for amphetamines are "Beans," "Black Beauties,"
"Black Mollies," "Cross-roads," "Double Cross," "Minibennies," "Pep Pills," "Rosas,"
"Roses," "Thrusters," "Truck Drivers," "Uppers," "Wake-ups," and "Whites." DRUG EN-
FORCEMENT, July 1979, at 39.
269. Two are optical isomers of each other. The third is a methalated form of either or
both of these isomers. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 282-83.
270. A. GOTH, supra note 210, at 310.
271. Ten mg is the usual oral dose. Five mg of dl-amphetamine is approximately
equivalent to 150 mg of caffeine (one cup of coffee). 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 284.
272. E. BASSUK & S. SCPOONOVER, supra note 20, at 280.
273. A. GoTH, supra note 210, at 268.
274. 0. RAY, supra note 8, at 284.
275. C. KORNTsKY, supra note 2, at 170.
276. "Speed" is methamphetamine put into liquid for injection intravenously. 0. RAY,
supra note 8, at 285.
277. Id. at 283.
278. R. JULEN, A PRiMER OF DRUG ACTION 87 (1975).
279. E. BASSUK & S. SCHOONOVER, supra note 20, at 282-83; C. KORNETSKY, supra note
275, at 170; MARTINDALE, supra note 27, at 306; PHYSICIANs' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 26,
at 1612.
280. R. JULIEN, supra note 278, at 87. In contrast to the disorientation with regard to
time and place that is characteristic of "amphetamine psychosis", i.e., the user is able to
retrospectively describe his condition in detail. E. BAssUK & S. SCHOONOVER, supra note 20,
at 284-85.
281. "As is generally true in paranoid schizophrenia, the hallucinations occurring dur-
ing the amphetamine-induced state are predominately auditory." C. KORNE-TSKY, supra note
2, at 170.
282. A. GOTH, supra note 210, at 311.
283. R. JULMN, supra note 278, at 87. There is considerable evidence indicating that
amphetamine abuse makes users more prone to violent behavior. In a study of amphetamine
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otyped behavior often precedes the onset of the psychotic epi-
sode.28 When prolonged high dosages of the drug are discontinued,
the user experiences extreme fatigue and a profound mental
depression.28 5
2. Methylphenidate and Phenmetrazine
The chemical structure of methylphenidate (Ritalin) is similar
to that of amphetamine. It is a mild central nervous system stimu-
lant, and its pharmacological properties are essentially the same as
those of amphetamine.28 6 It is used primarily for treatment of hy-
perkinetic behavioral disorders in children. Most abuse associated
with methylphenidate involves intravenous use of tablets dissolved
in water. 7
Phenmetrazine is medically used as an appetite suppressant,
and it produces effects comparable to those of other CNS stimu-
lants. Its abuse involves both oral and intravenous use.2 8 8
III. THE INTOXICATION DEFENSE
A. Introduction
On the night of August 20, 1976, John Foster, with the aid of
friends, blockaded a road with a tractor and started a bonfire by
the roadside. Richard and Patricia Young, who happened to be
driving along the road, stopped at the barricade. Foster, who had
known Young for thirteen years, approached the car with a .44
magnum revolver and remarked: "Dickie, you think I'm freaked
out, but if you don't turn off the motor and everybody get out of
the car I'm going to blow your f--ing head off." Young then sped
abusers who committed murder, one researcher concluded that in the cases he studied,
"homocide was clearly related to an amphetamine-induced delusional process and/or state
of emotional lability." Ellinwood, Assault and Homocide Associated with Amphetamine
Abuse, 127 AM. J. PSYCH. 1170, 1175 (1971).
284. C. KORNETSKY, supra note 2, at 170-71. "The apparently purposeless behavior
may consist of, for example, repetitive examination of contents of a handbag, continual
counting and rearrangement of objects, and so on. Accompanying the stereotyped behavior
may be grinding of the teeth (bruxism), licking of the lips, and shifting of the eyes from side
to side. Also characteristic of chronic stimulant overdose is a delusion of formication (ants
crawling over one's body)." Id. at 171.
285. PHYSiciANs' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 26, at 1612.
286. Franz, Central Nervous System Stimulants, in THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIs OF
THERAPEUTIcS 359, 365 (5th ed. L. Goodman & A. Gilman 1975).
287. DRUG ENFORCEMENT, July 1979, at 27.
288. Id. at 26-27.
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away while Foster fired several shots at the car.2 9 The evidence at
trial showed that Foster, at the time of the shooting, had been
under the influence of beer and possibly LSD. s°
This factual situation exemplifies the effects of intoxication on
human behavior. Alcohol, along with other drugs, impairs a user's
judgment, releases his inhibitions, and causes him to behave ab-
normally.29'1 The common excuse offered by such persons for their
actions while intoxicated is that they did not intend to commit the
act and that the drug made them go crazy.
Although sufficient to explain petty quarrels among friends,
this excuse historically has been rejected by the criminal law. Com-
mon law adheres to the rule that voluntary intoxication is no de-
fense to a criminal act. At one time, it was even suggested that
voluntary drunkenness was an aggravating circumstance that in-
creased the actor's culpability.9 2 The more commonly accepted
view, however, provides that "such a person shall have no privilege
by this voluntary contracted madness, but shall have the same
judgment as if he were in his right senses. ' 293 This strict rule arose
partly from the belief that intoxication could be easily feigned2
94
and partly from the belief that a man should be unable to avail
himself of the excuse of his own vice. 95
Even under the common law, however, there were circum-
stances in which intoxication could be a defense. For example, in-
toxication was a valid excuse to criminal behavior when induced by
fraud, duress, or mistake.2 9 6 Also, in the late nineteenth century
courts developed the "exculpatory doctrine," which allowed evi-
dence of intoxication to negate intent whenever it was an essential
289. State v. Foster, 405 A.2d 726, 728 (Me. 1979).
290. Id. at 730-31.
291. Paulsen, Intoxication as a Defense to Crime, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 1.
292. Blackstone states: "[Ojur law looks upon this as an aggravation of the offence,
rather than as an excuse for any criminal misbehaviour." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
* 25-26.
293. 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN * 32.
294. "Now touching the trial of this incapacity ... this is a matter of great difficulty,
partly from the easiness of counterfeiting this disability. . . and partly from the variety of
the degrees of this infirmity . . . ." Id.
295. See United States v. Drew, 25 F. Cas. 913 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 14,993).
296. Hale states:
That if a person by the unskilfulness of his physician, or by the contrivance of his
enemies, eat or drink such a thing as causeth such a temporary or permanent phrenzy
... this puts him into the same condition, in reference to crimes, as any other
phrenzy, and equally excuseth him.
1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN * 32.
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element of the crime.29
Today, the effect of intoxication on criminal responsibility is
well settled. A clear majority29 8 of American jurisdictions adhere to
the view that voluntary intoxication does not excuse a criminal act
unless the actor, because of his intoxication, could not form the
intent required in the definition of the crime. Moreover, some ju-
risdictions have recognized that involuntary intoxication is a com-
plete defense to criminal behavior in appropriate circumstances. 9'
While the rules applied to the intoxication defense have undergone
little change since the adoption of the strict common law approach,
it is the purpose of this section of the Special Project not only to
relate existing law but also to point out the difficulties in its justifi-
cation. Furthermore, this Special Project investigates the problems
that arise when the majority rule is applied to intoxication caused
by ingestion of narcotic drugs.
B. Voluntary Intoxication
In Commonwealth v. Graves,300 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court recently reiterated the majority rule in a case in which de-
fendant robbed and murdered an elderly man while under the in-
fluence of wine and LSD. The court held that evidence of intoxica-
tion could not serve as a defense to criminal conduct but could still
show that no crime was committed, by negating a particular ele-
ment of the crime.30 1 On this basis, the Pennsylvania court granted
defendant a new trial because robbery required a specific intent,
which defendant could possibly negate.3 02
Even today, the policy arguments that support this rule rest
297. "[A]lithough you cannot take drunkenness as any excuse for crime, yet when such
crime is such that the intention of the party committing it is one of its constituent elements,
you may look at the fact that a man was in drink in considering whether he formed the
intention necessary to constitute the crime." Regina v. Doherty, 16 Cox. Cr. C. 306, 308
(N.P. 1887).
298. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 45, at 342-43 (1972).
299. See Burrows v. State, 38 Ariz. 99, 297 P. 1029 (1931); People v. Penman, 271 IlM.
82, 110 N.E. 894 (1915). It is clear, however, that courts are hesitant in finding such appro-
priate circumstances. As one commentator has stated, "[The amazing thing about the fac-
tual situations met in the decisions on intoxication, which, because of the usual judicial
stress on fraud and coercion as exculpatory, becomes apparent only after close study of the
cases, is that involuntary intoxication is simply and completely nonexistent." Hall, Intoxi-
cation and Criminal Responsibility, 57 H-Rv. L. REv. 1045, 1056 (1944).
300. 461 Pa. 118, 334 A.2d 661 (1975).
301. Id. at 122-23, 334 A.2d at 663.
302. Because the robbery charge, under the felony-murder doctrine, led to the homi-
cide conviction, the latter was also overturned. Id. at 127, 334 A.2d at 665-66.
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primarily upon the notion that intoxication is sufficiently bad in
itself and that liability should be imposed for criminal acts com-
mitted while in such a state."' 3 The countervailing policy, which
accounts for the exculpatory doctrine, is that the inebriate's re-
duced mental capacity should prevent his being held to the same
standard of liability as his sober counterpart.30 4 Focusing on these
competing concerns, the California court in People v. Hood
30 5
noted that, while the moral capability of a drunken criminal is fre-
quently less than that of a sober person, it is a common belief that
a person who voluntarily gets drunk and commits a crime should
not escape the consequences.30 6 The combined effect of these poli-
cies has been that evidence of intoxication has been held admissi-
ble to negate the specific intent required for robbery,3 0 7 larceny, 0 8
burglary,30 9 attempted rape,310 assault with intent to kill,31M and
other crimes.312 First degree murder has also been reduced to sec-
ond degree murder with intoxication negating the element of delib-
eration or premeditation.1 Some courts, however, have refused to
go further and reduce first or second degree murder to manslaugh-
303. As one court has noted, the general rule that voluntary intoxication will not ex-
cuse criminal responsibility "rests upon public policy, demanding that he who seeks the
influence of liquor or narcotics should not be insulated from criminal liability because that
influence impaired his judgment or his control. The required element of badness can be
found in the intentional use of the stimulant or depressant." State v. Maik, 60 N.J. 203, 214,
287 A.2d 715, 720-21 (1972).
304. In actuality, most courts explain the exculpatory doctrine in terms of an objec-
tive, logical legal analysis-absent intent, a material element of the crime, the particular
crime cannot be committed. See Commonwealth v. Graves, 461 Pa. 118, 334 A.2d 661 (1975).
Thus,
[t]he judges insist straight-facedly that the doctrine is quite consistent with the tradi-
tional rule that voluntary drunkenness never excuses; it is simply that an objective
material element, "intention," is lacking in harms committed in gross intoxication.
Logic and law, but not sentiment for drunkards, effect the mitigation-so runs the
rationalization.
Hall, supra note 299, at 1049.
305. 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969).
306. Id. at 455, 462 P.2d at 377, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
307. See Terhune v. Commonwealth, 144 Ky. 370, 138 S.W. 274 (1911); State v. Rea-
gin, 64 Mont. 481, 210 P. 86 (1922).
308. See Edwards v. State, 178 Miss. 696, 174 So. 57 (1937); Daugherty v. State, 154
Neb. 376, 48 N.W.2d 76 (1951); Calvert v. State, 55 Okla. Crim. 346, 30 P.2d 717 (1934).
309. See Vickery v. State, 62 Tex. Crim. 311, 137 S.W. 687 (1911); State v. Phillips, 80
W. Va. 748, 93 S.E. 828 (1917).
310. See Whitten v. State, 115 Ala. 72, 22 So. 483 (1896); State v. Vanasse, 42 R.I. 278,
107 A. 85 (1919).
311. See Booher v. State, 156 Ind. 435, 60 N.E. 156 (1901); State v. Pasnau, 118 Iowa
501, 92 N.W. 682 (1902).
312. See Stenzel v. United States, 261 F. 161 (8th Cir. 1919) (espionage).
313. State v. Hall, 214 N.W.2d 205 (Iowa 1974).
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ter,3 1' holding that voluntary intoxication is sufficient to show mal-
ice aforethought. In addition, even those courts that allow intoxi-
cation to negate specific intent will still convict a defendant of a
lesser included general intent crime.
The attempt, based upon "types" of intent, to define an area
in which intoxication reduces or eliminates criminal responsibility
has caused confusion in its application.3 15 With regard to under-
standing criminal intent, one commentator has stated that "the
mental element is probably the most complex area of criminal
law. '13 1 Analytical problems arise when courts do not allow intoxi-
cation to negate general intent,817 but do allow the defense in spe-
cific intent crimes. 8
Logically, intoxication should negate any intent that is a nec-
essary element of a crime. Thus, as LaFave and Scott suggest, a
two-step inquiry is necessary. First, courts must determine what
intent the crime in question requires. Second, if there is an intent
requirement, courts must determine if the defendant in fact enter-
tained such an intent or knowledge of the crime.31 9 Under the sec-
ond prong, courts should allow evidence of intoxication to negate
the intent element and possibly reduce or eliminate the penalty
regardless of the nature of the intent.
Professor Hall clearly identifies the problem by noting that
"no immediate external situation, however criminal it appears to
be, can of itself preclude the possibility that the relevant mens rea
was lacking; and evidence aliunde is always admissible in that re-
314. See Commonwealth v. Graves, 461 Pa. 118, 124-25, 334 A.2d 661, 664 (1975). Con-
tra, Kane v. United States, 399 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1057 (1969)
(first degree murder reduced to voluntary manslaughter); United States v. King, 34 F. 302
(1888); Ray v. State, 257 Ala. 418, 59 So. 2d 582 (1952); State v. Gomez, 94 Idaho 323, 325,
487 P.2d 686, 688 (1971) (intoxication may be considered to negate malice aforethought);
State v. Sprouse, 63 Idaho 166, 118 P.2d 378 (1941). In Alabama and Idaho, however, both
first and second degree murder require an intent to take life.
315. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 298, at 344.
316. M. BASSIOUNI, SunsTANrE CRImImAL LAW 169 (1978).
317. "General intent" is used in the sense that a person intends the physical acts
which he commits. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 298, at 344.
318. Specific intent "is the intent to commit a particular act with a specific objective
in mind which constitutes the harm defined by law." M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 316, at 178.
319. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 298, at 344. Professor Hall points out that
[e]ach crime ... has its distinctive mens rea .... It is evident that there must be as
many mentes reae as there are crimes. And whatever else may be said about an inten-
tion, an essential characteristic of it is that it is directed toward a definite end. To
assert therefore that an intention is "specific" is to employ a superfluous term....
J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 142 (2d ed. 1960).
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gard. ' '320 Thus, a person charged with burglary, which requires a
specific intent to commit a felony, can establish, by external evi-
dence, that he lacked the required intent. Under the prevailing
rule, however, a person charged with rape, most often defined as
requiring only general intent, cannot prove lack of intent. His in-
tent is implied from the act of forced intercourse itself. This bifur-
cation, however, is clearly erroneous because "[w]hat .. . looks
like an obvious case of rape may turn out to be a mere assault and
battery because the perpetrator is the long-lost unrecognized hus-
band of the woman, or the parties may have consummated a legal
marriage which the woman later decided was illegal. ' s3 2  Thus, the
better and more logical view is to admit evidence of intoxication in
all cases in which intent, whether general or specific, is an element
of the crime. 22
Despite these arguments, many courts continue to adhere to
the antiquated distinction between specific and general intent. For
example, in United States v. Hartfield,3 23 a recent Ninth Circuit
case involving attempted robbery, the court held that in a specific
intent crime voluntary intoxication that precludes the formation of
the necessary intent may be established as a defense.2 4 Similarly,
in United States v. Scott 2 5 the District of Columbia Circuit up-
held this distinction in a robbery case. The court cited with ap-
320. Id. at 144.
321. Id.
322. Professor Bassiouni, however, argues for the validity of the distinction between
specific and general intent on the basis of foreseeability:
[Florseeability of the actor extends to potential general misconduct in which a "general
intent" suffices, while "specific intent" requires a positive knowledge either of the par-
ticular act that constitutes a part of the material element of the crime or of a specific
result. This mental state cannot be formulated by the intoxicated person, because the
foreseeability of such specific purpose cannot be imputed to that person at the time of
his or her sobriety.
M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 316, at 475.
Professor Bassiouni himself realizes, however, that this argument is based more on con-
venience than on logic:
An intoxicated person who acts "under the influence of intoxication" may be unable to
formulate a "general intent" and, a fortiori, a "specific intent." However, to unravel
the mysteries and functioning of the mind or to evaluate the shades of external influ-
ence exerted by foreign substances affecting a person's state of mind is not a task in-
tended by the law of crimes.
Id. at 474-75 (footnote omitted). With the aid of medical experts and modern technical
advancements, however, this task should be easier to undertake.
323. 513 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1975).
324. Id. at 259.
325. 529 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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proval its earlier decision in Edwards v. United States,326 which
held that when "a specific intent is essential to the crime charged,
and evidence is introduced that might create a reasonable doubt
whether the defendant was sober enough to be capable of forming
this intent, the jury must be instructed to acquit if they have such
a doubt.1217
Recently, however, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine took
an approach similar to that espoused by LaFave and Scott.32 8 In
State v. Foster 29 the court indicated that intoxication would be a
defense to an attempted homicide charge "if it raised a reasonable
doubt as to whether [appellant] intentionally or knowingly dis-
charged the revolver (i.e., intended the act) or as to whether he
intended to kill or knew to a substantial certainty that death
would result (i.e., intended the result)."330 Instead of focusing on
the distinction between general and specific intent, the court first
identified the crime to determine whether any intent was required
and then allowed evidence of intoxication to negate the existence
of such intent.
Despite the sound analysis in Foster, the majority of courts
nevertheless continue to distinguish between general and specific
intent in applying the intoxication defense. Adherence to the doc-
trine by these courts in the face of the logical paradox, however, is
unwarranted. Perhaps scholars, practitioners, and defendants alike
are faced with a situation in which "logic. . .must defer to history
and experience"331 because of judicial willingness to give up a doc-
trine that is supported by the weight of one hundred and fifty
years of English and American decisions. This doctrine, however,
was not the necessary development of English law. The earliest re-
ported cases332 make no mention of a distinction between specific
326. 172 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
327. Id. at 884.
328. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
329. 405 A.2d 726 (Me. 1979). For a statement of the facts of the case, see text accom-
panying notes 289-90 supra. It should be noted that there was evidence that defendant had
ingested LSD as well as beer before the shooting occurred. The court's failure to make a
distinction between these types of intoxication suggests it will apply its test to both situa-
tions. For a further discussion of the distinction between alcoholic and narcotic intoxication,
see Section D(1) infra.
330. 405 A.2d at 729.
331. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 429 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). In-
deed, it is possible that.this distinction could be attacked under equal protection grounds.
See Part V, Section A infra.
332. Regina v. Doherty, 16 Cox C.C. 306 (N.P. 1887); Regina v. Monkhouse, 4 Cox
C.C. 55 (N.P. 1849); Regina v. Cruse, 173 Eng. Rep. 610 (1838).
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and general intent. Instead, these decisions present the question in
terms of whether evidence of intoxication is sufficient to negate the
intent charged.388 Taken literally, this early application of the rule
applies equally to general and specific intent. Such an interpreta-
tion and application avoids the necessity for the hazy distinctions
between specific and general intent while enabling courts to apply
a more logically defensible rule.
C. Involuntary Intoxication
Although it has been argued that there is no realistic defense
of involuntary intoxication,3 4 courts have recognized the defense
in 'certain circumstances. Thus, at common law "if a person by the
unskilfulness of his physician, or by the contrivance of his enemies,
eat or drink such a thing as causeth such a temporary or perma-
nent phrenzy. . . this puts him into the same condition, in refer-
ence to crimes, as any other phrenzy, and equally excuseth him."33 5
Today, the defense is stated as including "[c]oerced intoxication,
pathological intoxication, intoxication by innocent mistake, and
unexpected intoxication resulting from the ingestion of a medically
prescribed drug."33' In City of Minneapolis v. Altimos ss7 the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota examined the history and present state
of the involuntary intoxication defense, noting that in all four situ-
ations an actor must meet the insanity requirement of his jurisdic-
tion.3 38 Thus, while voluntary intoxication must be of such a de-
gree as to render the actor incapable of acting knowingly and
intentionally, involuntary intoxication need only render the indi-
vidual incapable of appreciating the criminality of his conduct at
the time of the commission of the crime. 3 9
1. Coerced Intoxication
In Burrows v. State,30 the classic case involving coercion, the
Arizona Supreme Court held that coerced intoxication would not
333. "[Y]ou may look at the fact that a man was in drink in considering whether he
formed the intention necessary to constitute the crime." Regina v. Doherty, 16 Cox C.C. 306,
308 (N.P. 1887).
334. See note 299 supra.
335. 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN * 32.
336. City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 306 Minn. 462, 468, 238 N.W.2d 851, 856 (1976).
337. 306 Minn. 462, 238 N.W.2d 851 (1976).
338. For a discussion of the insanity defense, see Part IV infra.
339. See People v. Walker, 33 Ill. App. 3d 681, 687, 338 N.E.2d 449, 453 (1975).
340. 38 Ariz. 99, 297 P. 1029 (1931).
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excuse criminal behavior unless the influence exercised on a defen-
dant's mental state amounted to duress or fraud. 4' Consequently,
the court upheld the jury's determination that the coercion in-
volved3 42 did not amount to a legal defense. Many courts following
Burrows have strictly construed this coercion requirement. 4 A
comparison of the coercion requirement in other areas of the law,
however, indicates that such a rigid rule is unjustified. For exam-
ple, Professor Williston states that in contracts cases "the correct
rule, is that any unlawful threats which do in fact overcome the
will of the person threatened, and induce him to do an act which
he would not otherwise have done, and which he was not bound to
do, constitute duress. 3 44 Application of this subjective approach in
criminal law would allow juries to consider the particular suscepti-
bility of a defendant and would thereby result in a more equitable
treatment of criminal defendants on a case-by-case basis. Never-
theless, criminal courts continue to apply a harsh rule. One expla-
nation for continued use of this strict rule is societal distaste for
drunkenness. Also, there is a fear that a less stringent standard
will allow defendants to go free merely by stating "he made me do
it." This argument has little support, however, since the more sub-
jective approach espoused by Professor Williston has worked well
in other areas of the law.
2. Pathological Intoxication
Pathological intoxication has been defined as "intoxication
grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to
which the actor does not know he is susceptible. ' 45 Although case
law on this topic is extremely scarce,4 6 it seems that a defendant
341. Id. at 116, 297 P. at 1035.
342. Defendant, an eighteen-year-old, hitched a ride with the deceased, who had been
drinking and had liquor in the car. During the ride, deceased became abusive and
threatened to leave defendant in the middle of the desert if he did not drink. Defendant had
never tasted liquor before and refused at first. But, being penniless and in fear of being left
in the desert, defendant drank several bottles of beer. Later, when they reached a small
town, deceased bought some whiskey and again urged defendant to drink. Fearing what
deceased might do if he refused, defendant drank some whiskey. The effect of the alcohol
made defendant dazed and unaware of what was happening until after he killed the de-
ceased. Id. at 103-04, 297 P. at 1031.
343. See, e.g., State v. Bunn, 283 N.C. 444, 196 S.E.2d 777 (1973); Perryman v. State,
12 Okla. Crim. 500, 159 P. 937 (1916).
344. 13 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1605, at 669 (3d ed.
1970).
345. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5)(c) (proposed Official Draft, 1962).
346. One case that discusses the pathological intoxication defense is Kane v. United
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raising this defense must show that despite his knowledge of in-
take he was unaware of his susceptibility to an atypical reaction to
the substance.3417
3. Innocent Mistake
In People v. Penman,3 48 defendant committed murder after
having consumed several pink tablets that apparently contained
cocaine. At trial, he contended that the person who gave him the
tablets represented them to be breath purifiers. The court held
that if, as a finding of fact, defendant was insane at the time of the
murder, his defense of innocent mistake would lie. 49 This area is
similarly lacking in case law,350 but it is generally recognized that
the defense is valid when a person is deceived into taking the
intoxicant.3 51
4. Medical Prescription
In City of Minneapolis v. Altimuss52 the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that three requirements must be met before a defen-
dant can offer as a defense his unexpected intoxication from the
ingestion of a medically prescribed drug. First, "defendant must
not know, or have reason to know, that the prescribed drug is
likely to have an intoxicating effect. 3353 Second, "the prescribed
drug, and not some other intoxicant, [must] . . .in fact [be] the
cause of defendant's intoxication at the time of his alleged criminal
conduct."3 54 Third, defendant, "due to involuntary intoxication,
[must be] . ..temporarily insane. 3 55 Some courts have imposed
States, 399 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1968). Defendant Kane based his appeal of his conviction for
the shooting and killing of his wife on the defense of pathological intoxication. Kane had
previously suffered head injuries resulting in a reduced tolerance of alcohol. Aware of this
fact, he nevertheless became intoxicated on the day in question and suffered periods of
unconsciousness due to his consumption of beer. The court, while recognizing the Model
Penal Code's provision on pathological intoxication, refused to recognize it as an affirmative
defense. The court sidestepped the issue by stating that Kane's failure to raise the defense
in the trial court precluded his asserting the defense on appeal. The court noted, however,
that even if it allowed the defense Kane could not claim its protection because he was aware
of his peculiar susceptibility to alcohol. Id. at 736-37.
347. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 298, at 348.
348. 271 IM. 82, 110 N.E. 894 (1915).
349. Id. at 97-98, 110 N.E. at 900-01.
350. The author has found no cases in which innocent mistake has been argued.
351. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 298, at 348.
352. 306 Minn. 462, 238 N.W.2d 851 (1976).
353. Id. at 470, 238 N.W.2d at 857.
354. Id.
355. Id.
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an additional requirement that the prescribed drug be taken in ac-
cordance with medical advice or pursuant to a prescription.356 De-
cisional law is again scarce,57 but judicial authority indicates that
courts will rarely permit as a defense this form of involuntary
intoxication.358
A review of the four situations in which involuntary intoxica-
tion may be a defense to criminal behavior indicates that judicial
recognition of the defense has been tacit at best. Thus, although
the doctrine is accepted by the majority of jurisdictions, involun-
tary intoxication rarely appears as a viable criminal defense.
D. Areas of Inquiry
1. Drugs and the Intoxication Defense
Courts confronted with the issue of intoxication caused by in-
gestion of narcotic drugs have uniformly applied the same rules
developed with regard to alcoholic intoxication.5 Similarly, com-
mentators have refused to distinguish between alcoholic intoxica-
tion and narcotic intoxication.36 0 These courts and commentators,
however, fail or refuse to realize that there is a fundamental differ-
ence between the effects of alcohol and of narcotics upon human
behavior. While alcohol has the effect of releasing inhibitions and
setting free inner character traits of the individual,e some drugs
356. See Perkins v. United States, 228 F. 408 (4th Cir. 1915); People v. Koch, 250 A.D.
623, 294 N.Y.S. 987 (1937).
357. In Prather v. Commonwealth, 215 Ky. 714, 287 S.W. 559 (1926), the court held
that defendant, a morphine addict as a result of a painful operation, could not control his
actions and was therefore not guilty. See also Annot., 30 A.L.R. 761 (1924). Cf. Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 135 Va. 524, 115 S.E. 673 (1923) (Defendant, in pain from a toothache,
became intoxicated without a doctor's order and committed murder. His intoxication was
held voluntary.).
358. See City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 306 Minn. 462, 472, 238 N.W.2d 851, 858
(1976).
359. See People v. Aguirre, 30 Ml1. App. 3d 854, 334 N.E.2d 123 (1976); City of Minne-
apolis v. Altimus, 306 Minn. 462, 238 N.W.2d 851 (1976); State v. Roisland, 1 Or. App. 68,
459 P.2d 555 (1969); State v. Mriglot, 15 Wash. App. 446, 550 P.2d 17 (1976); State v.
Zamora, 6 Wash. App. 130, 491 P.2d 1342 (1971).
360. See M. BAssIouNI, supra note 316, at 472; W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note
298, § 45.
361. "Alcohol is an anesthetic or depressant, and its action is approximately the same
on all human central nervous systems: It is usually described as reducing the speed and
accuracy of perception, slowing down reaction time, and diminishing tensions, anxieties and
inhibitions." Bacon, Social Settings Conducial to Alcoholism, 164 J.A.M.A. 177, 178 (1957).
It has also been stated that a person's behavior pattern while under the influence of
alcohol remains consistent each time he is in a similar condition. See Note, Intoxication as
a Criminal Defense, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 1210, 1211 (1955).
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often have effects totally unrelated to the user's personality.3 62
An argument can be made, therefore, that the traditionally
strict rule concerning voluntary intoxication as it relates to crimi-
nal responsibility should not apply to narcotic drugs. A defendant
should be able to argue that he was totally unaware that the drug
would have a particular effect on him. A similar approach is found
in the innocent mistake strain of the involuntary intoxication doc-
trine. Although a defendant is not tricked into taking the drug, the
fact remains that at the time of ingestion he is unaware of the ac-
tual effect of the drug. In a sense, he is tricked by the drug itself.
Thus, the defense of voluntary narcotic intoxication, like that of
innocent mistake, should be based on the concept of foreseeability.
Indeed, one commentator has espoused utilization of the concept
with regard to the liability of inexperienced inebriates, stating that
"the inexperienced inebriate . . . cannot be held criminally liable
for a harm committed under gross intoxication." 63 Thus, in effect,
no liability would be imposed because the inexperienced inebriate
did not know the effect that the increased amount of alcohol would
have upon him. Similarly, although a person who drinks liquor can
reasonably foresee the possibility of a certain type of behavior
modification, one who uses narcotic drugs cannot foresee with any
certainty the possible behavioral changes that the drug may effect.
An alternative solution to the drug intoxication issue may be
found in State v. Foster,36 4 which involved both alcohol and drug
intoxication. The Maine court, rather than making an arbitrary
distinction between specific and general intent, held that intoxica-
tion will be a defense if a defendant shows that he did not intend
either the act or the result that occurred.3 65 Applying equally to
alcohol and drug intoxication, this test discards the specious dis-
tinction made between specific and general intent and instead al-
lows the intoxicated defendant to prove an absence of intent in
either situation.
A related problem that has not received judicial attention con-
cerns "flashbacks" that may occur with the use of drugs such as
LSD. In this situation, a person may experience hallucinations sev-
eral days or weeks after initial ingestion of the drug. Should a per-
son be held criminally responsible for acts committed during such
episodes? In other words, is the episode itself voluntary or involun-
362. See generally Part I supra.
363. J. HALL, supra note 319, at 554.
364. 405 A.2d 726 (Me. 1979).
365. Id. at 729.
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tary? Since medical testimony indicates that the occurrence of
flashbacks is rare and unpredictable 3 66 it cannot logically be as-
sumed that the person intended the drug to have this effect. Thus,
the traditional approach to intoxication is inadequate in dealing
with this problem. The flashback is a complete surprise to its vic-
tim, and its results are not intended from the initial use of the
drug. Logically, therefore, any criminal acts committed during a
flashback lack the requisite element of intent and must be excused
because the intoxication is "involuntary." It seems likely, however,
that courts, through their strict application of what constitutes
"involuntariness," will infer the requisite intent from the initial
"bad act" of ingesting the drug.
In State v. Roislands67 the Court of Appeals of Oregon refused
to accept the argument that the traditional rules for intoxication
should not apply to drug use. The court reasoned that voluntary
use of nonalcoholic intoxicants is comparable to alcoholic intake
due to the similarities between the requisite intent and the result-
ing action. Thus, it concluded that because of these similarities the
culpability should not differ.3 68 The court's reasoning, however,
seems based more upon notions of expedience than of logic. In or-
der to avoid a flood of cases based upon the subjective effects of
various drugs, courts are willing to impose a general rule that is
not directly applicable in all cases. Furthermore, because the inges-
tion of many drugs is an illegal act in itself, courts do not hesitate
to deviate from the course of pure logic and infer the requisite in-
tent for the act that follows despite differences in foreseeable
effects.
2. Actus Reus and Intoxication
The essence of criminal liability is that the actor must commit
a voluntary act (actus reus) and intend to commit the act (mens
rea).36' As has been shown, courts are reluctant to completely ex-
cuse intoxicated offenders on the ground that mens rea has been
negatedY.7 0 An argument may nevertheless be made that the intoxi-
366. See E. BRECHER, supra note 7, at 387.
367. 1 Or. App. 68, 459 P.2d 555 (1969).
368. Id. at 77, 459 P.2d at 559.
369. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 298, § 24, at 175-76.
370. See notes 300-68 supra and accompanying text. While courts will not convict in-
toxicated offenders for certain specific intent crimes, they usually convict for a lesser in-
cluded offense that only requires general intent.
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cated person has not performed a voluntary act.37 1
The Model Penal Code provides that involuntary acts include
those which are "not a product of the effort or determination of
the actor, either conscious or habitual. '37 2 Therefore, a defendant
could argue that, although intoxicated, his acts were not the pro-
duct of his will, particularly when he had no control over his ac-
tions. Thus, the element of voluntariness of the act is lacking when
the crime is committed. This situation is comparable to that of
committing a crime while sleepwalking, which some courts 73 have
held fails to satisfy the voluntary act requirement. The argument
is essentially that the defendant was unconscious when he commit-
ted the act.
It is unclear, however, whether a court would recognize this
argument in a defense based upon voluntary intoxication. The
Model Penal Code, for example, requires that liability be "based
on conduct which includes a voluntary act .... ",, Thus, while a
defendant may have been unconscious when the act was commit-
ted, voluntariness is found in the ingestion of alcohol or drugs. If a
defendant is further held to have knowledge of the possible conse-
quences of taking the intoxicating substance, he is guilty of the
crime. 7 5
Judicial unwillingness to find an involuntary act in such situa-
tions results in a body of law that, although lacking in logical ap-
plication, reflects the impact of societal mores on the decisionmak-
ing process of the courts. As long as society condemns either the
use or excessive use of alcohol and drugs, the existing rules on in-
toxication may be justified. Whether society's attitudes, and with it
the law's approach, toward alcohol and drugs will change is pure
speculation. At present, however, because these rules provide a
quick, efficient means to establish criminal responsibility "logic
• ..must defer to history and experience. '3 76
371. "Voluntary act" will be used in the sense of an "external manifestation of the
will." See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 298, § 25, at 180.
372. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
373. In Bradley v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 41, 277 S.W. 147 (1925), defendant awoke
from his sleep in a frightened state and started shooting, killing the woman with whom he
was sleeping. The court held that the jury could acquit if they found defendant was asleep
when he shot the deceased. See also Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183, 39 Am. Rep. 213
(1879).
374. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (emphasis supplied).
375. Still unanswered, however, is the problem of the "flashback." See text accompa-
nying note 366 supra.
376. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 429 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
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E. Conclusion
Although formulated many years ago, the intoxication defense
has remained essentially intact. Some courts have expanded the
doctrine by varying their interpretation of general and specific in-
tent,-77 while others have refused to adopt the exculpatory doctrine
at all.378 The vast majority of jurisdictions, however, adhere to the
rule that voluntary intoxication can only negate the intent that
constitutes an essential element of the crime.
Should courts continue to adhere to the view that voluntary
intoxication will not totally exonerate a defendant, the bias against
intoxication must be admitted and the use of a purely arbitrary
legal rationale discontinued. This realization is the first step to-
ward any significant change in the treatment of intoxicated offend-
ers. Courts must then realize that in the vast majority of cases
criminal intent cannot be implied from the initial innocent con-
sumption of alcohol. In those few cases where a person drinks to
help him "get his nerve up" to commit a crime, he should be dealt
with as if he were not intoxicated because he has formed the requi-
site criminal intent. When such intent cannot be found, however,
another approach becomes necessary.
Refusing to infer intent from the initial consumption of alco-
hol and drugs will not leave criminals free to steal, rape, or kill
without fear of punishment. If a person thinks "I can go ahead and
get drunk and not worry about whether I injure or kill someone,"
he has evidenced a recklessness sufficient to impose criminal re-
sponsibility. When this initial intent is lacking, however, courts
should alter their traditional approach. In a system that bases
criminal responsibility on the voluntary, intentional acts of an in-
dividual, a person must have the opportunity to prove the absence
of such volition or intent. As societal attitudes toward those intoxi-
cated by alcohol or other drugs change, the ultimate outcome may
be the imposition of alternative forms of treatment instead of
harsh criminal sanctions. At present, however, courts should at
least be willing to reduce the criminal sanctions when a defendant
can show that he formed no criminal intent at the time of
consumption.
377. See notes 329-30 supra and accompanying text.
378. See note 298 supra.
1980] 1185
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
IV. THE INSANITY DEFENSE
A. Introduction
The principle that insanity may reduce criminal responsibility
has been invoked regularly by drug dependent defendants seeking
to avoid or reduce punishment for criminal offenses.3 7 9 Because
virtually all courts are familiar and comfortable with the insanity
analysis it is not surprising that the insanity defense has become
the workhorse of counsel representing the drug dependent defen-
dant. This section of the Special Project first summarizes the re-
quirements of the defense and the various tests employed by the
courts. Second, it discusses the relationship between drug depen-
dence and insanity and analyzes the drug dependence theory.
Third, the leading cases under each of the insanity tests are sum-
marized and the recurring legal issues distilled. Fourth, several re-
lated defenses, including compulsion and diminished capacity, are
discussed. Finally, the drug dependent insanity plea is analyzed
with major emphasis on the role of the expert witness and the
factfinder and on several proposed solutions. It should be noted,
however, that no comprehensive doctrine concerning the drug de-
pendent defendant's criminal responsibility has been developed.
Consequently, the resolution of any particular case rests upon the
prevalent theory of the given jurisdiction and the particular fact
pattern of a given case.
B. The Insanity Plea
At common law, in order for a person to be held accountable
for his conduct and therefore criminally responsible, he must reach
a certain age and be mentally sound. Because the presence of the
requisite mens rea is an element of each offense, a defendant must
be able to formulate the requisite intent in order to be convicted of
the offense charged. Therefore, a defendant who is insane or other-
wise mentally incompetent may not be convicted or punished for
criminal acts committed while mentally disabled."' 0 Typically,
whether one is insane and thereby relieved of criminal responsibil-
379. For a discussion of the development of the principle that insanity reduces or ne-
gates criminal responsibility, see R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 850-52 (2d ed. 1969); Bennett,
Drug Addiction and Its Effect on Criminal Responsibility, 9 WAKE FOREST L. R-v. 179,
180-82 (1973).
380. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 316, at 487. Numerous reasons have been advanced for
the proposition that insanity should diminish criminal responsibility. See D. ToMPKINs, IN-
SANITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: A BIBLIOGRAPHY (1960).
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ity is a determination for the trier of fact, in accordance with the
particular test utilized.3 81
1. The Insanity Tests
(a) M'Naghten
The oldest of the commonly used insanity tests was formu-
lated in M'Naghten's Case.3 82 M'Naghten, intending to kill Sir
Robert Peel, shot and killed another person. Medical testimony
showed that at the time of the shooting he was acting under an
insane delusion and was in a disordered mental condition. The jury
returned a verdict of not guilty based upon an instruction that the
defendant had to be of sound mind in order to be convicted. The
modern M'Naghten insanity test, based upon the answers given by
the House of Lords, requires the defendant to prove one of two
assertions: either that he acted under a defect of reason occa-
sioned by mental disease that prevented him from comprehending
the nature and quality of his act or that if he did so comprehend
he did not know that his actions were wrong.83
The M'Naghten test has proven to be somewhat inflexible.
Thus, several states have combined M'Naghten with the "irresisti-
ble impulse" test.38 4 Under this version of the test, a defendant
may be relieved of criminal responsibility even when he can distin-
guish between right and wrong. He must show, however, that the
duress of the mental disease caused him to lose the power to de-
cide between right and wrong at the time of the criminal act. 85
(b) Durham
In Durham v. United States3 86 the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit expressed dissatisfaction with the M'Naghten test and con-
cluded that the better view is "simply that an accused is not crimi-
nally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental
disease or mental defect. 3 87 Thus, under the Durham rule the jury
first determines whether the defendant was sane or insane at the
381. Although expert testimony is admissible on the question of a defendant's mental
capacity and state, the determination of insanity is a pure legal issue. R. PERKINS, supra
note 379, at 858.
382. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
383. Id. at 722.
384. E.g., Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887).
385. See R. PERKINS, supra note 379, at 868-75.
386. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
387. Id. at 874-75.
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time of the offense. If the defendant was insane, the jury must
then determine whether the act was the "product" of his insanity.
The Durham rule, however, has not enjoyed wide acceptance
among the courts.3 88
(c) Model Penal Code
The drafters of the American Law Institute's Model Penal
Code rejected the M'Naghten-irresistible impulse test because
they perceived the need to include impairment of the capacity to
control behavior as well as the impairment of cognition in the in-
sanity definition. Furthermore, they wanted the legal definition to
include sudden or spontaneous acts over which the individual had
no control. The drafters also rejected the Durham rule because of
the confusing word "product."389 The model test provides:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks the substantial capac-
ity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not in-
clude an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-
social conduct.3 0
All the federal circuits, as well as a number of state jurisdictions,
have now adopted the Model Penal Code test in some form.3 91
2. Presumptions and Burden of Proof
In most jurisdictions a criminal defendant is presumed to be
both sane and of sound mind. When some evidence of insanity or
mental disease is introduced, however, the presumption of sanity
disappears and the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove the
defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. 9 2 The defendant, of
388. In fact, the same court that formulated the rule later modified it in McDonald v.
United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The Second Circuit, typical of other courts'
reaction, noted that "[t]he most significant criticism of Durham, however, is that it fails to
give the fact-finder any standard by which to measure the competency of the accused."
United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 621 (2d Cir. 1966). The D.C. Circuit ultimately
rejected Durham in favor of the Model Penal Code test. See United States v. Brawner, 471
F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); notes 389-90 infra and accompanying text.
389. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 158-159 (Tent. Draft No. 4 1955).
390. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
391. See Comment, Criminal Responsibility and the Drug Dependence Defense-A
Need for Judicial Clarification, 42 FORDHAm L. REV. 361, 373 n.69 (1973). For a listing of
other jurisdictions adopting the Model Penal Code test, see United States v. Brawner, 471
F.2d 969, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
392. United States v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254, 259 (9th Cir. 1975) (only slight evidence
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course, must withstand the government's countervailing evidence
that shows him to be sane.393 Thus, to successfully attack a finding
of sanity on appeal, the defendant must demonstrate that reasona-
ble men would possess a reasonable doubt as to his sanity. 94
3. Admissibility of Evidence on the Insanity Issue
Because only slight evidence of insanity is sufficient to rebut
the presumption of sanity,395 it is axiomatic that admissibility
standards for evidence on the issue of insanity should be liberal.
Consequently, most jurisdictions allow the introduction of any
relevant testimony related to the defendant's mental state. For ex-
ample, in Faught v. State,396 defendant offered as evidence expert
testimony that he was insane because of a compulsion caused by
drug addiction. The trial court, however, excluded the entire testi-
mony, admonishing the jury not to consider the expert testimony
concerning defendant's condition. 97 The Indiana Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that defendant was entitled to have the jury con-
sider all expert testimony concerning his state of mind at the time
of the robbery.3 98
Most courts also are fairly liberal concerning the expertise re-
quired of the defendant's witnesses. For example, in United States
v. Kienlen3 99 the court held that testimony by a general practi-
tioner to show defendant's mental capacity at the time of the
crime was properly admitted. Similarly, in United States v.
Milne00 the Fifth Circuit allowed defendant to support an insanity
defense with the testimony of three lay witnesses who testified to
his heavy drug use and bizarre behavior. The court reasoned that
of insanity is sufficient to shift the burden onto the government); United States v. Milne,
487 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (5th Cir. 1973); People v. Jackson, 116 Ill. App. 2d 304, 314, 253
N.E.2d 527, 532 (1969).
393. See United States v. Strutton, 494 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1974).
394. United States v. Greene, 497 F.2d 1068, 1073 (7th Cir. 1974). See also United
States v. Kissane, 478 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1973). The jury, of course, may find from conflict-
ing testimony that the government has carried its burden of proving the defendant sane
beyond reasonable doubt. Webber v. United States, 395 F.2d 397, 399 (10th Cir. 1968).
395. See note 392 supra and accompanying text.
396. 155 Ind. App. 520, 293 N.E.2d 506 (1973).
397. Id. at 522, 293 N.E.2d at 507.
398. Id. at 524, 293 N.E.2d at 509. On a subsequent appeal the same court reiterated
its holding, stating that evidence of the effects of drug addiction and/or withdrawal symp-
toms was also admissible. Fraught v. State, 162 Ind. App. 436, 438, 319 N.E.2d 843, 845
(1974).
399. 415 F.2d 557 (10th Cir. 1969).
400. 487 F.2d 1232 (5th Cir. 1973).
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both lay and expert evidence should be admitted to give a defen-
dant an adequate opportunity to develop the insanity defense. 0 1
In Brown v. United States40 s the court went a step further by rul-
ing that a defendant has the right to judicial assistance in develop-
ing the basis for his insanity defense.403
4. Result of the Insanity Plea
A defendant is accorded varying treatment when his insanity
plea is successful. In some jurisdictions mandatory civil commit-
ment follows a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. In other
jurisdictions the jury, after rendering its verdict, makes a separate
determination concerning the defendant's present state of mind. If
the jury finds that the defendant is presently sane, he is immedi-
ately released. If the defendant is deemed insane, however, he is
confined to a mental institution until he is considered fit for re-
lease. 04 Thus, in those jurisdictions that adhere to the latter ap-
proach, it is in the best interest of the defendant to secure a find-
ing of insanity at the time of the alleged offense, followed by a
finding of sanity at the close of the trial.05
C. The Insanity Plea and the Drug Dependent Defendant
1. Drug Dependence and Criminal Responsibility
The effect of drug use and drug addition on mens rea has led
a number of courts and commentators to raise the issue of their
relation to criminal responsibility. One commentator has offered
two basic arguments against punishing addicts when their behavior
is caused by drug use and drug addiction.40 8 First, the punishment
401. Id. at 1235. The Ninth Circuit similarly has held that evidence of intoxication is
admissible on the issue of insanity. This reflects the general rule that virtually all evidence
relevant to mental competency should be admitted. See United States v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d
254 (9th Cir. 1975).
402. 331 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
403. Id. at 823.
404. See M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 316, at 495, and authorities collected therein. The
time of release is determined solely by local law.
405. The Seventh Circuit has held that a defendant is entitled to introduce evidence
of his mental condition as it existed both at the time of the crime and at time of trial. See
United States v. Kissane, 478 F.2d 1098, 1101 (7th Cir. 1973). Furthermore, most jurisdic-
tions require an examination of the defendant to determine his competency to stand trial.
Although different standards are used to determine competency and insanity, the results of
the competency test might be dispositive of a defendant's sanity at time of trial. See gener-
ally Annot., 73 A.L.R.3d 16 (1976).
406. Bennett, supra note 379, at 182-83. This section of the Special Project focuses
solely on insanity based arguments for diminished criminal responsibility. Other theories of
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does not serve the deterrent function of the criminal law because
the dominant addiction is the incapacity of the addict to abstain
from using drugs despite a desire to quit. Thus, the addict lacks
the power to stop using drugs. Second, punishment of addicts does
not succeed due to the addict's continued psychological and physi-
ological dependence on drugs. Thus, punishment of addicts would
not accomplish two of the functions of the criminal law
-deterrence and rehabilitation. The only purpose arguably served
would be that of retribution.4 07
The argument that drug addiction negates criminal responsi-
bility was judicially recognized as early as 1926 in Prather v. Com-
monwealth.0 s In Prather defendant had been convicted of conver-
sion of trust funds after testifying to a hazy recollection of using
the proceeds to buy morphine. His physicians testified at trial that
he had been an addict and insane at the time of the offense, but
was of sound mind at the time of trial. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals held that it was immaterial whether defendant's habit was
voluntary or the result of medical treatment. The court further
noted that, because expert testimony indicated defendant's in-
sanity, the responsibility for the commission of the crime should
not be distinguished from that of other insane persons.0 9
Several alternative requirements are implicit in all the in-
sanity tests. Specifically, the defendant must show that at the time
of the crime an underlying medical disease or defect either pre-
vented him from distinguishing right from wrong, deprived him of
the substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his con-
duct, made him unable to conform his behavior to the require-
ments of the law, or produced the allegedly criminal conduct. Due
to these requirements, the defendant first must establish a nexus
between his drug use or drug addiction and a mental disease or
defect in order to successfully assert insanity as a bar to criminal
the effect of drugs and drug dependence on criminal responsibility are treated in Parts III
and V of this Special Project.
407. "Thus, society has recognized over the years that none of the three asserted pur-
poses of the criminal law-rehabilitation, deterrence and retribution-is satisfied when the
truly irresponsible, those who lack substantial capacity to control their actions, are pun-
ished." United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1966) (emphasis supplied).
408. 215 Ky. 714, 287 S.W. 559 (1926).
409. Id. at 716-17, 287 S.W. at 560. While Prather may be read for the proposition
that compulsion due to drug addiction is exculpatory, a more exact interpretation is that the
court was primarily persuaded by the insanity theory. The case, however, leaves open the
question whether defendant's drug addiction alone was sufficient to constitute insanity, or
whether the addiction precipitated a mental disease or defect that would legally constitute
insanity.
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responsibility. Additionally, the defendant must meet the require-
ments of the applicable insanity test.410
Proof of addiction alone is generally insufficient to relieve a
defendant from criminal responsibility under a jurisdiction's in-
sanity test.411 Thus, the District of Columbia Circuit has held that,
while narcotic addiction is an illness, the jury must still find a
causal relationship between the defendant's disease or defect and
the offense charged.1 2 Similarly, Missouri courts have held that
drug abuse, absent a psychosis, is not a defense under that state's
insanity test.4 13 The most forceful recent statement that drug ad-
diction alone will not relieve a defendant from criminal responsi-
bility, even if he was incapable of conforming his conduct to the
requirements of the law, was enunciated by the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Sheehan.'" The court
explained that drug addiction did not meet the state's version of
the Model Penal Code test unless there was a causal connection
between the drug addiction and a mental disease or defect of the
defendant.41 5 Thus, it is evident that in addition to proof of drug
addiction the defendant must also offer some evidence of a mental
disorder to trigger the insanity defense. Specifically, the insanity
issue "may arise if, but only if, the evidence shows that a particu-
lar addiction is such as to 'substantially affect mental and emo-
tional processes and substantially impair behavior controls.' "416
410. See notes 383-94 supra and accompanying text.
411. Bennett argues that proof of addiction alone is not enough even to present the
issue of insanity to the trier of fact. Bennett further points out that a personality disorder
alone is insufficient to raise the insanity issue. He argues, however, that since addiction and
personality disorder nearly always coexist, the combination of the two might be sufficient to
diminish or negate criminal responsibility. Bennett, supra note 379, at 184.
412. See Castle v. United States, 347 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1964). The same court later
explained that while narcotic addiction alone, without more, is not a mental disease or de-
fect and thus does not constitute some evidence of insanity, it may be of probative value
along with other evidence on the issue of responsibility. Green v. United States, 383 F.2d
199, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1967). In the same year the circuit court elaborated on the nature of
probative value:
Evidence of [drug addiction], however, has probative value in conjunction with evi-
dence of mental illness, and the effect of a deprivation of narcotics on behavioral con-
trols is a relevant circumstance. We have recognized, too, that extensive and protracted
addiction may so deteriorate such controls as to produce irresponsibility within our
insanity test.
Gaskins v. United States, 410 F.2d 987, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (footnotes omitted).
413. See Dorsey v. State, 586 S.W.2d 810 (Mo. App. 1979).
414. 383 N.E.2d 1115, 1118 (Mass. 1978).
415. Id. at 1119. For a further analysis of the court's decision, see text accompanying
notes 430-40 infra.
416. Watson v. United States, 439 F.2d 442, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, J., concur-
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In United States v. Moore417 defendant attempted to avoid
this nexus requirement through a novel theory of exculpation
based on a self-control analysis. He argued that an addict's self-
control is composed of two factors that determine whether he will
perform certain acts to obtain drugs-his physical craving for the
drug and his character or moral standard. Defendant then pro-
posed a balancing test with regard to these factors and argued that
the addict should be relieved of criminal responsibility whenever
the first factor outweighs the second. 418 The court, rejecting this
argument because of its seemingly broad implications, emphasized
that the logic of defendant's argument would extend to any illegal
act by a defendant for the purpose of obtaining narcotics for per-
sonal use.419 Implicit in the court's reasoning is its adherence to the
notion that only a demonstrable mental disease or defect will di-
minish criminal responsibility and that mere compulsion caused by
drug addiction will not.
2. Drug Related Insanity Plea Under the Various Tests420
Jurisdictions using the M'Naghten standard apply the same
test to defenses of insanity from drug addiction as to insanity re-
sulting from any other cause. Thus, the drug dependent defendant
must be prepared to show that his addiction caused a mental dis-
ease sufficient to produce a defect of reason that would render him
unable to distinguish right from wrong.42 1 In People v. Kelly42 2 de-
fendant pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity to a charge of as-
sault with intent to commit murder. The testimony tended to show
that she was suffering from an underlying schizophrenia, but was
normally a sane person. The evidence, however, also established
that her voluntary ingestion of drugs over a two month period had
triggered a legitimate psychosis and had rendered her unable to
distinguish right from wrong on the day of the crime. The trial
court, after finding defendant incapable of understanding that her
act was wrong, ruled that insanity was no defense because it arose
ring in part, dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted).
417. 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973).
418. Id. at 1145.
419. Id. The court further observed that under defendant's theory a bank robber, who
stole because he needed to support his drug habit, would have a patently greater lack of free
will than the mere possessor. Id. at 1146.
420. For a comprehensive collection of cases and detailed discussion of the drug
depedence insanity defense, see Annot., 73 A.L.R.3d 16 (1976).
421. See id. at 71-75.
422. 10 Cal. 3d 565, 516 P.2d 875, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1973).
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from voluntary ingestion of drugs rather than because of a settled
and permanent nature. The California Supreme Court reversed,
however, holding that under the M'Naghten test the cause of the
insanity was immaterial. The court observed that insanity induced
by drug dependence affects responsibility in the same manner as
insanity produced by any other cause.423 Responding to the trial
court's reasoning, the California Supreme Court held that insanity
must be settled but not necessarily permanent in order to negate
criminal responsibility.4 24
In State v. Maik425 defendant, on trial for killing a friend by
stabbing him sixty-six times, claimed that a voluntary ingestion of
LSD triggered a psychotic episode and rendered him legally insane
at the time of the crime. The New Jersey Supreme Court, identify-
ing the issue as whether the voluntary use of drugs would support
a defense of insanity under the M'Naghten standard,426 held that
the M'Naghten test did not require an inquiry into the etiology of
the underlying mental disease. Thus, the court concluded that the
insanity defense was available. In support of its reasoning, the
court noted that the state's civil commitment statute afforded am-
ple protection to society by mandating confinement of insane de-
fendants to mental institutions until they recover from their in-
sanity. Both Kelly and Maik, however, fail to clarify or define the
parameters of diseases or defects sufficient to invoke the insanity
plea and instead leave that role to the trier of fact.
Several decisions from the District of Columbia Circuit have
indicated that the Durham test might be available to drug depen-
dent defendants if they can demonstrate that their addiction
caused a mental disease or defect. The defendant, however, would
then have to show that his criminal act was the "product" of the
addiction. For example, in Castle v. United States, 27 the court,
after noting that testimony before the jury explained the defen-
423. Id. at 576, 516 P.2d at 882-83, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 178-79.
424. Id. at 576-77, 516 P.2d at 883, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 179. But see Brand v. State, 123
Ga. App. 273, 180 S.E.2d 579 (1971), in which the court held that only insanity of a
permanent fixed character, even though caused by a drug, will raise the lack of criminal
responsibility.
425. 60 N.J. 203, 287 A.2d 715 (1972).
426. Id. at 212, 287 A.2d at 720. The court noted at the outset of its analysis that all
the insanity tests of criminal responsibility "have the common characteristic of attempting
to distinguish between the sick and the bad." Id. at 213, 287 A.2d at 720.
427. 347 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 929 (1965). Subsequently,
the same court attempted to define mental disease or defect caused by drug addiction as an
abnormal condition of the mind substantially impairing capacity to control behavior. See
Heard v. United States, 348 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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dant's degree of dependence on drugs and his withdrawal symp-
toms, determined that a jury could have found a causal relation-
ship between the drug dependent abnormality and the criminal
act. In all these cases the District of Columbia Circuit stressed that
drug addiction alone does not constitute a mental disease or de-
fect. Instead, the court required evidence of a serious mental dis-
ease that produced the criminal act before a verdict of acquittal by
reason of insanity under the Durham test could be returned. 28
Of the established tests, the Model Penal Code test is perhaps
most receptive and readily adaptable to a plea of drug related in-
sanity. 2 In United States v. Freeman430 defendant asserted insuf-
ficient capacity caused by drug addiction as a defense to a charge
of selling narcotics. Experts testified that defendant was a narcot-
ics addict and confirmed alcoholic who had experienced toxic psy-
chosis and whose addiction had caused a destruction of brain tis-
sue. They also testified that although he was cognizant of his
actions he could not distinguish right from wrong. The govern-
ment's expert contended that although the defendant had some
difficulty in distinguishing right from wrong it was not sufficient to
satisfy M'Naghten. He also testified that there was no indication
of brain disease. The trial court found that defendant failed to sat-
isfy the requirements of the M'Naghten test. On appeal, the Sec-
ond Circuit reversed, holding that the trial court should have used
a less rigid test of insanity. After reviewing the other available
tests the court adopted the Model Penal Code standard. In sup-
port of its selection, the court noted that only that test permitted
sufficient introduction of evidence to allow the trier of fact to de-
cide the full mental state of the accused-his characteristics, po-
tentialities and capabilities.4 3 1 Thus, it is clear that the court per-
ceived the Model Penal Code test as allowing the broadest possible
exposure of a defendant's mental condition to the judge or jury.
Even under the Model Penal Code test, however, the defen-
dant must still establish a causal link between drug addiction and
a mental disease or defect. Thus, in Faught v. State432 a jury in-
428. See, e.g., Gaskins v. United States, 410 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Green v. United
States, 383 F.2d 199 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 961 (1968); Hightower v. United
States, 325 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 994 (1966). For a detailed dis-
cussion of the relation of the Durham test to drug dependent insanity, see Annot., 73
A.L.R.3d 16, 64-71 (1976).
429. See Annot., 73 A.L.R.3d 16, 16, 25 (1976).
430. 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
431. Id. at 619-23.
432. 162 Ind. App. 436, 319 N.E.2d 843 (1974).
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struction that mere evidence of drug addiction is not a defense to a
crime was held proper in a jurisdiction that adopted the Model
Penal Code standard. Moreover, Commonwealth v. Sheehan43 3 is a
recent indication that the Model Penal Code actually may impose
a very strict standard on the drug dependent defendant. In
Sheehan defendant appealed a pharmacy robbery conviction by
arguing that his drug addiction qualified as a mental disease or
defect that, along with the other necessary elements, warranted a
finding of not guilty by reason of insanity under the state's version
of the Model Penal Code test.43 4 The court rejected this argu-
ment,435 stating that if "the normal consequences of drug addiction
are to be accepted as a ground for avoidance of responsibility for
criminal conduct, the Legislature is the appropriate body to make
that determination." 436 The court, however, held that if the defen-
dant, as a result of a mental disease or defect, lacks substantial
capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law
apart from drug addiction, his drug addiction should not bar him
from asserting lack of criminal responsibility. 37
Sheehan also rejected the notion that drug addiction would
justify conduct on the theory that drug consumption is involun-
tary.4 - 8 The court then indicated a preference for treating claims of
lack of criminal responsibility according to the particular facts of
each case.439 Although the court's strong language is perhaps un-
warranted, it indicates that the Model Penal Code test does not
necessarily signify a liberalization of the criminal responsibility
standards for the drug dependent defendant. While the court's
analysis appears sound, it presents some danger to the purpose of
the test-to allow the trier of fact to consider the broadest evi-
dence of the accused's mental health. A better approach might
have been to limit the holding by stating that an expert's conclu-
433. 383 N.E.2d 1115 (Mass. 1978).
434. Massachusetts had earlier adopted the Model Penal Code insanity test in Com-
monwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 226 N.E.2d 556 (1967).
435. See note 432 supra and accompanying text.
436. 383 N.E.2d at 1118.
437. Id. at 1118-19. The court added that the defendant may avail himself of the in-
sanity plea if his consumption of drugs, apart from drug addiction itself, causes a mental
disease or defect. It nevertheless stressed that if such disease is solely the product of volun-
tary consumption of drugs the insanity defense is not available. Id. at 1119.
438. Id. at 1119 (citing Fingarette, Addiction and Criminal Responsibility, 84 YALE
L.J. 413 (1975)).
439. 383 N.E.2d at 1119. The court was particularly bothered by the testimony of de-
fendant's expert, who argued that drug addiction is a mental disease or defect that in this
case prevented defendant from conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law.
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sions concerning the defendant's ability, as a result of his drug de-
pendence, to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law
are not necessarily binding on the trier of fact.40
3. Temporary Insanity
A sharp division exists among jurisdictions concerning
whether a state of temporary insanity, caused by voluntary intoxi-
cation and ingestion of drugs, might relieve a defendant of criminal
responsibility. In State v. Bower 441 the court expressly held that
temporary insanity does not relieve the accused of culpability. In
People v. King441 the court reversed a directed verdict of not guilty
by reason of insanity, holding that the question of insanity is a
determination for the jury and not the court. The court neverthe-
less held that the jury reasonably could have concluded that defen-
dant's voluntary use of LSD, marijuana, barbiturates and alcohol
on the day he killed his wife negated his accountability for the act,
since experts testified that the LSD rendered him incapable of
controlling his actions. In State v. Maik443 the court similarly con-
cluded that a temporary psychotic episode qualified as a state of
insanity under the M'Naghten test. Thus, the current status of
this defense is unsettled and should therefore be explored in de-
fending a criminal defendant who commits an offense while under
the effects of drugs, particularly those with unknown or unex-
pected effects. Certainly the defense should be raised when intoxi-
cation triggers an underlying psychotic disorder of a settled nature.
4. Distinctions in Offenses
Although some commentators have raised the possibility that
the finding of lack of criminal responsibility might be related to
the nature of the drug offense committed, there is no direct au-
440. See discussion of the appropriate scope of expert testimony in notes 454-57 infra
and accompanying text.
441. 73 Wash. 2d 634, 440 P.2d 167 (1968). The court relied primarily on a statute that
provided in part:
Any person who shall have committed a crime while insane, or in a condition of mental
irresponsibility, and in whom such insanity or mental irresponsibility continues to ex-
ist, shall be deemed criminally insane within the meaning of this chapter. No condition
of mind induced by the voluntary act of a person charged with a crime shall be
deemed mental irresponsibility within the meaning of this chapter.
Id. at 646, 440 P.2d at 175 (citing WASH. REv. CODE § 10.76.010) (emphasis in original).
442. 181 Colo. 439, 510 P.2d 333 (1973).
443. 60 N.J. 203, 287 A.2d 715 (1972). See notes 382-85 supra and accompanying text.
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thority to support this suggestion.444 In United States v. Moore4 5
the court discussed whether defendant was a trafficking or a non-
trafficking addict, but ultimately concluded that the distinction
was not relevant to the outcome.446 Accordingly, the availability of
an insanity based defense for a drug dependent defendant should
not depend upon any distinctions rooted in the nature of the of-
fense committed.
D. Related Defenses
1. Insanity Induced by Intoxication
A number of jurisdictions adhere to the view that insanity
may be offered as a valid defense even when induced by voluntary
drug intoxication. Thus, in Webber v. United States447 defendant
supported his plea of not guilty by offering evidence of temporary
insanity induced by drugs. The court accepted defendant's argu-
ment, reasoning that the government failed to carry its burden to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the req-
uisite mental capacity at the time that he committed the crime.4 8
This analysis appears to be the correct one. The insanity defense
should not depend on the cause of the insanity; when the plea is
offered the court should instruct the jury on insanity and charge
the jury that it must find the defendant competent at the time of
the crime in order to return a conviction.
2. Compulsion
There is limited authority to support the proposition that the
drug addict, when out of drugs, is incapable of refraining from any
444. See generally Annot., 73 A.L.R.3d 16 (1976).
445. 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973).
446. Id. at 1144. It is possible that the debate over the propriety of the distinctions
stems from the provisions of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966 [NARA], 28
U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906 (1976). A person eligible under the Act who is charged with a crime
may be advised that the charges will be held in abeyance if he elects to submit to an exami-
nation to determine whether he is an addict and whether he is likely to be rehabilitated
through treatment. The accused electing this alternative must consent to civil commitment
if he is found suitable for treatment. If the treatment is successful the charge is dismissed; if
after three years it is not successful, prosecution is resumed. The principal shortcoming of
NARA, however, is that a large number of addicts are excluded from treatment. For a dis-
cussion of the possibility of expanding the Act's scope, see text accompanying notes 461-64
infra.
447. 395 F.2d 397 (10th Cir. 1968).
448. The court, however, found that the government carried its burden. Id. The valid-
ity of this defense was implied by the same court three years later in United States v. Stew-
art, 443 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1971). See also note 422 supra and accompanying text.
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act that might replenish his supply and that his actions are there-
fore the same as the criminal actions of an insane person. 49 State
v. Flores450 is the strongest authority for the proposition that proof
of compulsion due to drug addiction may exculpate a defendant
from criminal responsibility. In Flores defendant sought to avoid
criminal liability for a burglary charge by asserting that he was a
longtime addict and therefore had to steal to supply his habit. He
introduced testimony of two psychiatrists to support his claim.
The first expert testified that defendant was under an extremely
strong compulsion to obtain funds to satisfy his habit and that he
experienced extreme anxiety and a very urgent need. The second
expert asserted that defendant was mentally ill because his crimi-
nal acts were the product of a mental illness that made it impossi-
ble for him to distinguish right from wrong. Therefore, this expert
concluded that defendant's heroin addiction subjected him to an
irresistible impulse to steal to supply his habit. The court ruled
that this undisputed testimony was adequate to support a defense
of insanity and held that the trial court's refusal to give an instruc-
tion on insanity constituted reversible error.45 '
E. Analysis
From the previous discussion it is clear that the final determi-
nation of whether the drug dependent defendant will be relieved of
responsibility for his criminal act hinges on a determination of the
trier of fact. In particular, the leeway granted the fact finder in its
evaluation of expert testimony is extremely crucial. In United
States v. Milne45 2 the court delineated the functions of the expert
and the fact finder and concluded that the expert may voice opin-
ion as to insanity but not as to criminal capacity. The court rea-
soned that no witness could speak on the ultimate issue of criminal
responsibility without reaching legal conclusions. Similarly, in
United States v. Freeman455 the court stressed that, although rele-
vant expert testimony will always be admissible, the testimony
449. See Annot., 73 A.L.R.3d 16, 50-51 (1976). For example, in Prather v. Common-
wealth, 215 Ky. 714, 287 S.W. 559 (1926), the court held that drug-induced insanity was
indistinguishable from insanity based on other causes.
450. 82 N.M. 480, 483 P.2d 1320 (Ct. App. 1971).
451. Id. at 481, 483 P.2d at 1321. The court did not express the concern of earlier
courts that the expert testimony may have usurped the function of the jury. Cf. Common-
wealth v. Sheehan, 383 N.E.2d 1115 (Mass. 1978), discussed in notes 33-40 supra and ac-
companying text.
452. 487 F.2d 1232 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1123 (1974).
453. 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966). See notes 430-31 supra and accompanying text.
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must be in the form of furnishing data, and not a legal conclusion
or moral pronouncement.454 The court emphasized that once the
expert witness furnishes information as to the mental state of the
accused, society-represented by the trier of fact-must then de-
cide whether a man with the characteristics described should be
held accountable for his acts.4 5
The distinction drawn by these courts between the functions
of expert witnesses and the trier of fact is best preserved by the
Model Penal Code test. In fact, the desire to preserve this tradi-
tional distinction motivated the District of Columbia Circuit's abo-
lition of the Durham test in United States v. Brawner.45' The
court feared that the Durham rule placed undue reliance on expert
testimony and thus usurped the jury's proper role.457 The court
then adopted the Model Penal Code test, reasoning that this test
encouraged a broad presentation of the mental capacity issue to
the jury.
Thus, of the three established tests for determining the valid-
ity of a defendant's insanity defense, the Model Penal Code test
best serves the interests of both the individual defendant and the
penal system. This test allows the jury to consider a defendant's
incapacity to control his behavior and provides a more flexible ap-
proach to differing factual situations than the M'Naghten and
Durham rules.458 In addition, by insisting on a determination of
culpability by the trier of fact, the Model Penal Code test prevents
the insanity issue from being reduced to a battle between prosecu-
tion and defense expert witnesses.
Because of the complex nature and increasing use of drugs,
however, even the Model Penal Code test may be insufficient to
deal with the drug dependent defendant under all circumstances.
Many addicts who are not legally insane may still need treatment
that a prison sentence cannot afford them. Nevertheless, the lack
of recent decisions in this area indicates that courts are not yet
willing to confront this issue in an adequate fashion. Thus, pre-
454. 357 F.2d at 623.
455. Id. at 619-20. Similarly, in Hill v. State, 252 Ind. 601, 251 N.E.2d 429 (1969), the
court observed that the psychiatrist will best serve the ends of justice if he limits his testi-
mony simply to the description of the defendant's mental state.
456. 471 F.2d 969, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
457. "But the difficulty. . . is that the medical expert comes, by testimony given in
terms of a non-medical construct ("product") to express conclusions that in essence embody
ethical and legal conclusions." Id. at 982-83. The Brawner case provides an excellent discus-
sion of the merits of the ACI test, and of the proper roles for the expert and the jury.
458. See note 390 supra and accompanying text.
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dicted expansion of insanity defense theories, to cover more situa-
tions has not yet occurred.4 59 Instead, reliance continues to be
placed on the imposition of legal sanctions because of the wide-
spread belief that the addict is an autonomous person responsible
for his conduct. 60
This increasing complexity posed by the effects of drugs upon
the human mind may nevertheless force society-and consequently
the courts-to adopt new and more equitable approaches with re-
gard to treatment of the drug dependent defendant. A promising
interim solution when dealing with drug dependent defendants
who are not found insane under traditional analysis is a reexami-
nation of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966.461 Under
the Act, eligible individuals may consent to civil commitment and
rehabilitation as opposed to criminal punishment. The narrow def-
inition of an "eligible individual,"' 62 however, has not allowed for
full development of the Act's ideals. 63 Basically, the purpose of
the Act is to provide alternative forms of treatment to individuals
with drug dependence problems.' 6 ' Consequently, a broad applica-
459. E.g., Bennett, supra note 379, at 191. Bennett suggested that there is an addi-
tional "viable approach" to the issue of criminal responsibility as related to drug addiction
other than insanity-pharmacological duress. To date no court has embraced this approach.
460. See Fingarette, Addiction and Criminal Responsibility, 84 YALE L.J. 413, 444
(1975). The author argues forcefully that "there is no medical foundation for adopting the
general proposition at the crux of the exculpatory legal arguments, the proposition that ad-
dictive conduct is involuntary." Id. at 443.
461. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906 (1976). See note 449 supra. 28 U.S.C. § 2901 defines an
eligible individual as follows:
(g) "Eligible individual" means any individual who is charged with an offense
against the United States, but does not include-
(1) an individual charged with a crime of violence.
(2) an individual charged with unlawfully importing, selling, or conspiring to
import or sell, a narcotic drug.
(3) an individual against whom there is pending a prior charge of a felony
which has not been finally determined or who is on probation or whose sentence fol-
lowing conviction on such a charge, including any time on parole or mandatory re-
lease, has not been fully served: Provided, That an individual on probation, parole, or
mandatory release shall be included if the authority authorized to require his return
to custody consents to his commitment.
(4) an individual who has been convicted of a felony on two or more occasions.
(5) an individual who has been civilly committed under this Act, under the Dis-
trict of Columbia Code, or any State preceeding [sic] because of narcotic addiction on
three or more occasions.
462. See Kadish, Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act: A Shot in the Arm to Criminal
Sentencing? 12 Am. CRIm. L. REv. 753, 771 (1975). Professor Kadish criticizes the narrow
definition of eligible addicts after a thorough analysis of the eligibility criteria under the
Act.
463. See id. at 753-54.
464. Id. at 2.
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tion of the Act may do more to protect the drug addict and mem-
bers of society than would the imposition of criminal penalties for
limited time periods with little hope for rehabilitation.
Therefore, the current exclusions of the Act should be modi-
fied in order to make the election between prosecution and treat-
ment available to a greater percentage of addicts. By affording the
individual this choice between meaningful treatment and prosecu-
tion under fairly rigid standards, the Act would effect the goal of
rehabilitation of the addicted offender while still protecting society
from his criminal behavior. Because the Act's present structure
represents merely an unfulfilled ideal, reevaluation is needed to
render the Act truly effective.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSES
A. Equal Protection
The common-law doctrine that bars voluntarily intoxicated
defendants from introducing evidence of intoxication to negate the
existence of general mens rea while permitting involuntarily intox-
icated defendants to negate its existence may be subject to an
equal protection challenge. Similarly, the related common-law dis-
tinction that allows defendants to introduce evidence of voluntary
intoxication to negate the requisite mens rea in specific intent
crimes but not in general intent crimes also may be open to an
equal protection attack.6 5 While an equal protection challenge
may not invalidate the current voluntary intoxication doctrine on
constitutional grounds, it does expose the serious analytical flaws
in the doctrine and suggests that a reevaluation of the legal treat-
ment of voluntarily intoxicated defendants is needed.
The fourteenth amendment mandates that no state shall deny
to persons within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."66 In Bolling v. Sharp467 the Supreme Court held that the
equal protection requirements of the fourteenth amendment also
apply to the federal government through the fifth amendment. An
equal protection problem thus arises whenever the government
utilizes classifications to treat similarly situated persons unequally.
Under current equal protection analysis the purpose and effect of
the governmental classifications are scrutinized to determine the
465. For a complete discussion of intoxication and criminal defendants see Part III
supra.
466. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
467. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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applicable standard of review. Initially, the court inquires whether
the governmental classification disadvantages persons within a
"suspect class"4 68 or whether it affects a "fundamental interest. '469
If a suspect class or a 'fundamental interest is involved, then the
compelling interest test applies; the classification cannot stand un-
less the state's interest is compelling and the classification is the
least restrictive means of achieving the state's goal.17 0 When
neither of these elements is involved but there is a significant indi-
vidual interest other than mere economics, 1 the classification
must bear a substantial relation to a legitimate state objective. 72
The common-law doctrine of intoxication permits involunta-
rily intoxicated defendants to negate the requisite mens rea for
general intent crimes by introducing evidence of intoxication, but
denies such an opportunity to voluntarily intoxicated defendants.
These two classes of defendants clearly are situated similarly-in
both cases intoxication impairs their mental ability. Assuming that
both are equally intoxicated at the time of the alleged actus reus,
their ability to formulate the requisite general mens rea is also
equal. Nevertheless, the two classes of defendants are treated un-
equally. While legal treatment of voluntarily intoxicated criminal
defendants may not interfere with a suspect class or a fundamental
468. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimacy); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (race).
469. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); Harper v. Vir-
ginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(access to appeal in criminal cases); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation).
470. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
471. If the interest involved is one of mere economics, then the rational basis test
applies; the classification must bear only a rational relation to a legitimate state interest.
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961);
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). When this standard of review is utilized,
great deference is given to the legislative judgment employed in drawing the classifica-
tion-almost any justification, whether articulated or implied, will sustain the statutory
scheme. Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine On a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAsv. L. Rav. 1, 18-20 (1972).
472. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). This strand of equal protection analysis
has developed over the past ten years and provides heightened judicial scrutiny for impor-
tant noneconomic interests that the court has not declared fundamental and for "semi-sus-
pect" classes. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (invalidating a state statute
that provided for the commitment of incompetent criminal defendants on terms different
from all other individuals); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating a gender based
classification); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (invalidating a state statute that
exposed indigents to incarceration beyond the statutory maximum to "work off" their fines).
See also Gunther, supra note 471; Yarbrough, The Burger Court and Unspecified Rights:
On Protecting Fundamental and Not-So-Fundamental "Rights" or "Interests" Through a
Flexible Conception of Equal Protection, 1977 DuKE L.J. 143.
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interest, the unequal treatment clearly affects a significant
noneconomic interest: remaining free from incarceration. 73 Thus,
under equal protection analysis this classification should be re-
quired to bear a substantial relation to a legitimate state goal.
The state's justification for unequal treatment of these two
groups typically is explained by various legal fictions termed trans-
ferred intent or constructive intent. Essentially, intent is trans-
ferred back to the time of voluntary intoxication, constructed from
the act of voluntary intoxication, or presumed from the facts of
voluntary intoxication.7 4 These fictions, however, mask the relaxed
notion of intent to which voluntarily intoxicated defendants are
held-only this class of defendants may be prosecuted on the basis
of presumed intent supplied by an otherwise lawful antecedent act.
The logical outcome of these fictions is that the state punishes not
the criminal act, which may be the accidental outcome of intoxica-
tion, but the act of voluntary intoxication. It is this re-
sult-punishment of the voluntary intoxication-that is suscepti-
ble to an equal protection challenge. The state discriminates, in
effect, between persons who accidentally commit a "criminal act"
while voluntarily intoxicated and those who accidentally do not
commit such an act.
This analysis simply points out that the state does not meet
the burden of showing a substantial relation between the classifica-
tion and a legitimate state interest. If intoxicated defendants are
473. Stated conversely, voluntarily intoxicated defendants are denied the opportunity
to have every element of the crime charged against them proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Supreme Court has indicated that individuals have a significant interest in remaining
free from incarceration and improperly extended incarceration. In Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715 (1972), the Court sustained an equal protection challenge to a state statute that
subjected criminal defendants to a more lenient commitment standard and to a more strin-
gent release standard from mental institutions than those applicable to all other individu-
als. The Court identified the defendant's concern in the matter as an interest in remaining
free from what amounted to "a commitment for life." Id. at 723, 724. Although a specific
standard of review was not articulated, the Court obviously required that the classification
bear a substantial relation to a legitimate state interest by rejecting the state's contention
that the existence of pending criminal charges justified the classification. Id. at 729-30. See
also Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972) (challenge to commitment procedures under
Wisconsin's Sex Crimes Act); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) (challenge to commit-
ment procedures under New York Correction Law).
The interest in remaining free from incarceration has also received heightened scrutiny
from the Court in the due process arena. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)
("[T]he liberty of a parolee. . . includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and
its termination inflicts a 'grievous loss' on the parolee. ... ); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.
235, 263 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[T]his Court will squint hard at any legislation
that deprives an individual of his liberty-his right to remain free.").
474. See text accompanying notes 300-33 supra.
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capable of formulating intent sufficient to satisfy the general mens
rea requirement,7 5 then there is no logical reason to distinguish
between voluntary and involuntary intoxication. Although the in-
voluntariness of a defendant's intoxication should remain a viable
defense, the prosecution still should be required to prove both the
actus reus and the mens rea of each offense charged regardless of
the reasons for the intoxication.47 6 Furthermore, because critical
analysis demonstrates that the state actually punishes the act of
voluntary intoxication and not the crime charged, then the only
conceivable way to avoid an equal protection challenge is to impose
criminal sanctions for voluntary intoxication.
The foregoing analysis applies, a fortiori, to the distinction
currently drawn between voluntarily intoxicated defendants
charged with general intent crimes and voluntarily intoxicated de-
fendants charged with specific intent crimes. In the former situa-
tion the defendant cannot offer intoxication as evidence of lack of
intent, yet in the latter case the defendant is permitted to assert
that his intoxicated state negated the ability to form the specific
intent required for the crime. 7 Thus, intoxication alone may
never be the basis for an acquittal if the defendant is charged with
a general intent crime, but it may lead to an acquittal of a specific
intent crime charge.47 8 This distinction clearly discriminates be-
tween similarly situated persons, and it is difficult to see how this
particular classification bears a substantial relation to a legitimate
state interest. Under this unequal treatment, it is possible for an
intoxicated defendant to be convicted of a relatively mild general
intent crime while another equally intoxicated defendant might be
acquitted of a heinous specific intent crime.
The difficulties exposed by equal protection analysis could be
avoided by abolishing the legal fictions currently drawn between
voluntarily and involuntarily intoxicated defendants with respect
475. See R. PERKINS, supra note 379, at 900-02.
476. Furthermore, in crimes requiring negligence or recklessness as a mens rea compo-
nent, the fact of voluntary intoxication alone might be enough to show the requisite mental
state.
477. This distinction is sanguinely explained in the treatises by arguing that intoxica-
tion is not a defense nor exculpatory evidence, but rather prevents the formation of a neces-
sary element of a specific intent crime. See, e.g., R. PERKINS, supra note 379, at 900. This
argument, however, applies equally well to general intent crimes; this application is avoided
by relying on the legal fictions of transferred, constructive, or presumed intent. See text
accompanying note 473 supra.
478. See, e.g., Edwards v. State, 178 Miss. 696, 174 So. 57 (1937); State v. Reagin, 64
Mont. 481, 210 P. 86 (1922); Daugherty v. State, 154 Neb. 376, 48 N.W.2d 76 (1951).
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to general intent crimes and between voluntarily intoxicated de-
fendants charged with general intent crimes and similar defen-
dants charged with specific intent crimes. Instead, prosecutors
should be required to prove each element of every offense regard-
less of the manner in which a particular defendant acquired the
intoxicated state. Correspondingly, intoxicated defendants should
be permitted to offer evidence of their intoxication to negate the
presence of the requisite mens rea. As long as our jurisprudence
adheres to the concept of mens rea in criminal law, legal fictions
attached to this concept should not be permitted to mask serious
equal protection problems.
B. Eighth Amendment
The principle that criminal responsibility will be assessed to
an individual only when his actions are a voluntary product of a
free will 47 9 has long been regarded as a cornerstone of the common
law. Reflected in the requirement that punishment be morally le-
gitimate, s° the viability of this tenet is tested by an examination
of how the law defines the scope of a drug addict's481 criminal re-
sponsibility. Although the Supreme Court recognized as early as
1925 that narcotics addiction was a disease,482 it was not until the
Court's 1962 decision in Robinson v. California48 3 that major legal
efforts to relieve an accused drug addict of criminal responsibility
were galvanized.
In Robinson the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a
defendant who had been prosecuted under a state statute that
made it a crime to "be addicted to the use of narcotics. ' 484 The
479. If a defendant was to be punished for an act which was involuntary or not based
on the exercise of free will, no deterrent purpose would be served by the imposition of crimi-
nal sanctions. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952). Thus, the acts per-
formed by those who are insane, unconscious, or under duress are considered to lack the
element of mens rea and are generally not punished by the criminal law. See, e.g. Brawner
v. United States, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Virgin Islands v. Smith, 278 F.2d 169 (3d
Cir. 1960); Rex v. Crutchley, 172 Eng. Rep. 909 (1831).
480. See, e.g., J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 70-75, 163-70 (2d ed.
1960); Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 423-24 (1958).
481. Congress has defined a "drug addict" by statute as: "[A]ny individual who habit-
ually uses any narcotic drug so as to endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare,
or who is so far addicted to the use of narcotic drugs as to have lost the power of self-control
with reference to his addiction." 21 U.S.C. § 802(1) (1976).
482. Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925).
483. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
484. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (West 1957), amended 1963 Cal. Stats., ch.
913, repealed 1972 Cal. Stats., ch. 1407: "No person shall use, or be under the influence of,
or be addicted to the use of narcotics, except when administered by or under the direction
[Vol. 33:11451206
1980] SPECIAL PROJECT: DRUGS 1207
Court found that the California statute made the "'status' of nar-
cotics addiction a criminal offense" for which the offender could be
punished "whether or not he has ever used or possessed any nar-
cotics within the State. ..- and held that the statute thus in-
flicted a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the proscrip-
tions of the eighth amendment as applied to the states through the
fourteenth.488  The scope of the Court's decision was uncertain,
however, because the majority also emphasized the inability of the
states to punish a disease or illness, 48 7 especially one that could be
contracted "innocently or involuntarily. s4 88 Cases soon clogged the
courts, spawned by this "disease prong" of the opinion, which ar-
gued that Robinson did not merely proscribe the punishment of a
status with no concomitant actus reus,489 but that the eighth
amendment prohibited the application of criminal sanctions to
those whose actions were compelled by addiction. 490 Prior to focus-
of a person licensed by the State to prescribe and administer narcotics."
485. 370 U.S. at 666.
486. Id. at 667. Five justices adhered to the majority's eighth amendment rationale.
Justice Harlan concurred on the basis that the statute as construed authorized punishment
for "a bare desire to commit a criminal act." Id. at 679.
487. Id. at 666-67. "Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment
for the 'crime' of having a common cold." Id. at 667.
488. Justice Stewart noted that persons might become addicted from legitimate medi-
cal prescriptions or that an infant might be born addicted as a result of its mother's habit.
Id. at 667 n.9.
489. The majority of jurisdictions that have considered the scope of Robinson have
adhered to this status-act distinction, construing Robinson narrowly as prohibiting punish-
ment of an addict only for a condition of the body or mind and thus viewing the eighth
amendment as offering no defense if the craving for the drug is accompanied by an act such
as possession, use, self-administration, purchase, or concealment. See Sanchez v. Nelson,
446 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1971) (possession distinguished); United States v. Rundle, 429 F.2d
1316 (3d Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (conviction for unlawful use of drugs distinguished); Bailey
v. United States, 386 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1967) (possession); United States ex rel. Swanson v.
Reincke, 344 F.2d 260, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 869 (1965) (self-administration); People v.
Zapata, 220 Cal. App. 2d 903, 34 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1963), appeal dismissed, 377 U.S. 406
(1964) (possession); Nutter v. State, 8 Md. App. 635, 262 A.2d 80 (1968) (acts resulting from
cocaine addiction); State v. Margo, 40 N.J. 188, 191 A.2d 43 (1963) (per curiam) (under the
influence); Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 129 N.W.2d 175, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1004
(1965) (use of nonprescribed drugs).
490. While most of the cases cited in note 489 supra make reference to this implica-
tion, for arguments criticizing the narrow status-act interpretation of Robinson on the
ground that certain conduct is symptomatic of the addiction and thus unpunishable under
Robinson, or should be considered inseparable from the status of addiction, see Powell v.
Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 554 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting); Watson v. United States, 439 F.2d
442 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Driver v.
Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966) (holding limited by Powell v. Texas); Dubin, Mens
Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due Process Concept of Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN.
L. REv. 322, 365 (1966); Greenawalt, "Uncontrollable" Actions and the Eighth Amendment:
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ing on how Robinson's progeny have analyzed and delineated the
scope of the eighth amendment's application to addiction and re-
lated conduct, a brief examination of the cruel and unusual pun-
ishment provision is appropriate.
The eighth amendment49' to the United States Constitution
prohibits the federal government from imposing cruel and unusual
punishment for federal crimes.492 The principle traces its roots to
the Magna Charta, and the phrase "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" was first incorporated in the English Declaration of Rights
of 1688. 4es While the cruel and unusual punishment clause was
viewed at the time of its enactment as proscribing only cruel and
inhumane methods of physical punishment,9 its scope has been
extended to embody changing notions of contemporary values and
civilized behavior, and in modern times it has been held to pro-
hibit more sophisticated methods of punishment.495
In Weems v. United States496 the Supreme Court held that
the eighth amendment precluded excessive punishment when the
penalty imposed was disproportionate to the seriousness of the of-
fense, although the method of punishment was not inherently
cruel. Chief Justice Warren defined the basic concept underlying
the eighth amendment in Trop v. Dulles as "nothing less than the
dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the
amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within
the limit of civilized standards. '49 7 Robinson, holding that the Cal-
Implications of Powell v. Texas, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 927 (1969); Comment, Demise of "Sta-
tus"-"Act" Distinctions in Symptomatic Crimes of Narcotic Addiction, 1970 DUKE L.J.
1053 (1970).
491. The eighth amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend.
ViII.
492. While almost all the states have similar constitutional provisions, the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits the states from applying criminal sanctions
for state crimes that would violate the eighth amendment. A state is, however, free to con-
strue its constitutional provision more broadly than the federal government.
493. See Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel
and Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 846 (1961); Note, The Constitutional Prohibi-
tion Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment-Its Present Significance, 4 VAND. L. REV.
680 (1951).
494. See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S.
130, 135-36 (1878); Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive
Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635, 637 (1966).
495. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (loss of citizenship); see Comment, Criminal
Responsibility and the Drug Dependence Defense-A Need for Judicial Confrontation, 42
Fordham L. Rev. 361, 368 (1973).
496. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
497. 356 U.S. at 100-01.
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ifornia statute exceeded the limits imposed by the eighth amend-
ment, identified a third class of situations in which the protection
of the cruel and unusual punishment clause could arise-not only
to prohibit the method or amount of punishment that could be
applied but also to restrain the power of the states to define
crimes.
The courts wrestled for more than a decade with the issue of
how the concept of criminal responsibility for the drug addict had
been affected by the novel application of the eighth amendment in
Robinson before the parameters of the decision could be regarded
as accepted by a consensus of the circuits. While the Robinson
Court distinguished between holding the addict liable for his sta-
tus and prosecuting him for acts relating to his disease, 49 there is a
logical inconsistency in prohibiting punishment for a disease but
allowing it for acts such as possession and use that are not only
symptomatic of that disease but in practical terms necessary for
addiction to exist. This inconsistency provoked some courts and
numerous strong dissents 499 to argue that Robinson could be read
to offer exculpation for crimes related to addiction. A narrow inter-
pretation of Robinson, however, would merely preclude such
crimes of status or condition similar to the California statute.
It is doubtful that all offenses generally falling under the ru-
bric of "status crimes" could be considered to violate the eighth
amendment under Robinson because many have established tradi-
tions in the common law.500 At the other extreme, the extension of
an eighth amendment defense to offenses not incidental to addic-
tion, such as larceny, forgery, and robbery, has been uniformly re-
jected by all courts which have considered such arguments.501 Al-
though arguments that the eighth amendment should be extended
to acts incidental to addiction have also generally failed, it is
within this area that controversy has flourished over the interpre-
498. 370 U.S. at 666.
499. See cases cited in note 490 supra.
500. See Cruel and Unusual Punishment, supra note 494, at 647. In many cases prior
acts can be imputed from the statute's wording. Habitual offender statutes have been up-
held on the rationale that they constitute sentencing measures, not substantive crimes. Sta-
tus crimes had been invalidated prior to Robinson on the grounds of violating substantive
due process and of being void-for-vagueness. See Langetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451
(1977); In re Newbern, 53 Cal. 2d 786, 350 P.2d 116, 3 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1960).
501. See, e.g., United States v. Krehbiel, 493 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1974) (bank robbery);
37 Cal. Rptr. 734, superseded on other grounds, 62 Cal. 2d 748, 401 P.2d 928, 44 Cal. Rptr.
320 (1965) (operating motor vehicle while addicted to narcotics); Bryson v. State, 7 Md.
App. 353, 255 A.2d 469 (1969) (grand larceny); DeVougas v. State, 29 Wis. 2d 489, 139
N.W.2d 17 (1966) (forgery of prescription).
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tation to be afforded Robinson.
The first significant extension of Robinson came four years af-
ter the decision when two federal circuit courts held that chronic
alcoholics could not be held criminally liable for public drunken-
ness. In Driver v. Hinnant5 2 the Fourth Circuit reversed the ac-
cused's conviction under a North Carolina statute making it a mis-
demeanor punishable by imprisonment to be drunk in a public
place. 503 The court labeled chronic alcoholism a disease, and, al-
though concluding that mens rea was lacking,50 4 it interpreted
Robinson as controlling because while "[tlhe California statute
criminally punished a 'status'-drug addiction-involuntarily as-
sumed; the North Carolina Act criminally punishes an involuntary
symptom of a status-public intoxication." 505 The District of Co-
lumbia Circuit reached the same result as the Driver court in
Easter v. District of Columbia.508 The case presented essentially
the same facts as did Driver,07 but the court declined to consider
the applicability of Robinson to crime induced by or related to ad-
diction 50 8 and instead focused on common law grounds and statu-
tory interpretation. 0
Although numerous cases raised the issues that Robinson pro-
scribed the punishment of a narcotics addict for acts such as pos-
session, use, and self-administration, the Supreme Court consis-
tently refused to grant certiorari to delineate the scope of its
holding.5 10 Thus, because lower courts viewed the related act as
502. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966) (holding severely limited by Pow-
ell v. Texas).
503. It was the defendant's third offense, and he had been sentenced to two years
imprisonment. Id. at 763.
504. Id. at 764.
505. Id. at 764-65.
506. 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
507. Unlike Driver, however, the defendant in Easter was not proven to be a chronic
alcoholic; the trial judge had excluded evidence to that effect, ruling that chronic alcoholism
was not a defense to the charge. Id. at 51.
508. Id. at 55 n.8.
509. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-501 to 24-513 (1961) (amended as §§ 24-521 to 24-535 D.C.
CODE ANN. (1968)). The Easter court reasoned that, notwithstanding the relevance of the
Congressional statute "[o]ne who is a chronic alcoholic cannot have the mens rea necessary
to be held responsible criminally for being drunk in public." 361 F.2d at 53.
510. Castle v. United States, 347 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 929
(1965); Hutcherson v. United States, 345 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 894
(1965); United States ex rel. Swanson v. Reincke, 344 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 869 (1965); Lloyd v. United States, 343 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
952 (1965); Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 129 N.W.2d 175, motion for rehearing denied,
131 N.W.2d 169, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1004 (1965).
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distinct from the status of addiction, they continued to hold that
punishment for narcotics related offenses was not precluded by
Robinson.511
The Supreme Court failed to clarify the scope of the Robinson
decision in Powell v. Texas, 512 in which the Court was asked to
hold, as had the Fourth Circuit in Driver, that the eighth amend-
ment prevented conviction of a chronic alcoholic for intoxication.
Justice Marshall, writing for a four member plurality that upheld
the conviction, interpreted Robinson as a limitation on the power
of the states to impose punishment when no actus reus had oc-
curred, and he distinguished Powell since it involved the act of be-
ing drunk in public.51 Justice Powell identified the source of much
of the confusion pertaining to the scope of the eighth amendment
and its relationship to the issue of the criminal responsibility of an
addict, however, when he stressed that the "doctrines of actus
reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and duress have
historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment
of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and
changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of the
nature of man." 514
Justice Fortas, writing for the dissent, viewed Robinson not
only as proscribing punishment for a status unaccompanied by an
act, but also for any "condition" that is a characteristic pattern of
a disease and the result of a compulsion symptomatic of a dis-
ease.515 The dissent's rationale would thus not apply to such "inde-
pendent acts or conduct" as drunk driving or robbery.""
The plurality in Powell, however, maintained that Robinson
stood for the simple proposition that "[c]riminal penalties may not
be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless
to change. 5 17 The decisive vote to affirm the conviction was cast
by Justice White in concurrence. He viewed the trial record as in-
511. See cases cited in note 489 supra. But cf. Morales v. United States, 344 F.2d 846,
849 n.2 (9th Cir. 1965) (dictum).
512. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
513. Id. at 533.
514. Id. at 536.
515. Id. at 567-69 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
516. Id. at 559 n.2. Compare Justice Fortas' views with those expressed by Chief Judge
Bazelon, whose suggested insanity proposal would allow a defense in any situation where it
could be shown that the defendant lacked the power to control his behavior to such an
extent that he could not be held justly responsible for his conduct. United States v. Brawn-
er, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
517. Id. at 567; See Bason, Chronic Alcoholism and Public Drunkenness-Quo
Vadimus Post Powell, 19 AM. U.L. REv. 48, 59 (1970).
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sufficient to support a finding that the appellant was under a com-
pulsion to be drunk in a public place."" Justice White's view of
Robinson, however, offered vitality to those who contended that
the eighth amendment provided a drug defense for the addict-
possessor:
If it cannot be a crime to have an irresistible compulsion to use narcotics...
I do not see how it can constitutionally be a crime to yield to such a compul-
sion. Punishing an addict for using drugs convicts for addiction under a dif-
ferent name .... Unless Robinson is to be abandoned, the use of narcotics
by an addict must be beyond the reach of the criminal law.510
In 1970 the District of Columbia Circuit suggested in Watson
v. United States520 that the eighth amendment would bar the pun-
ishment of an addict for the possession of narcotics maintained
solely for personal use.52 1 Although resolving the case on other con-
stitutional grounds, 522 the court recognized that acts necessary for
possession could not logically be considered separate from the sta-
518. Justice White noted that it might be possible for some alcoholics to make a satis-
factory showing that they could not refrain from frequenting public places; Robinson would
then prevent their conviction for public intoxication. 392 U.S. at 552 n.4. (White, J., concur-
ring). His words suggest that the burden upon an alcoholic asserting a Robinson defense to
such a charge would be easier to meet if the defendant was homeless.
519. Id. at 548-49 (White, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Justice White's view of
Robinson is consistent with his dissenting opinion in that decision, when he declared: "If it
is 'cruel and unusual punishment' to convict appellant for addiction, it is difficult to under-
stand why it would be any less offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment to convict him for
use on the same evidence of use which proved he was an addict." 370 U.S. at 688 (White, J.,
dissenting). He further noted that the majority, in enumerating instances where the States
retained power to legislate against the narcotics trade, made no mention of the use of nar-
cotics. Id. No case has held, however, that proof of addiction alone is a defense to possession
or any other addiction-related crime.
520. 439 F.2d 442 (1970) (rehearing en banc): "[I]f Robinson ... means anything, it
must also mean in all logic that (1) Congress either did not intend to expose the nontraffick-
ing addict possessor to criminal punishment, or (2) its effort to do so is as unavailing consti-
tutionally as that of the California legislature." Id. at 452.
Watson was prosecuted for the possession of thirteen capsules of heroin, one-half his
daily habit. For an analysis of the amount of controlled substances necessary for conviction
of the statutes regulating controlled substances in the various American jurisdictions, see
Note, Criminal Liability for Possession of Unusable Amounts of Controlled Substances, 77
COLUM. L. Rav. 596 (1977).
521. See cases cited in note 510 supra for earlier cases in which this argument was
made.
522. The court vacated and remanded for resentencing after holding that the Narcotic
Addict Rehabilitation Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251-4255 (1970), which excluded addicts from con-
sideration for civil commitment if they had been convicted of two prior felonies, violated the
equal protection concept of due process as applied to the appellant. The appellant also ar-
gued that due process demanded the recognition of a defense of addiction for the acts com-
pelled by such addiction; his primary argument in trial court had stressed an insanity
defense.
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tus of addiction, which Robinson had held to be immune from
punishment. The court did not view Powell as a barrier to estab-
lishing a drug defense based on Robinson for the nontrafficking ad-
dict-possessor. 23 It withheld such an extension of the eighth
amendment, however, pending further explication of Robinson and
Powell by the Supreme Court.52 4
The Supreme Court never addressed the issue raised by the
dicta in Watson. Three years later the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, the only circuit to have lobbied for an extension of the eighth
amendment to provide a limited drug addiction defense, brought
itself into conformity with the other jurisdictions. After lower
courts in the District of Columbia split on whether to adopt Wat-
son's eighth amendment rationale,52 5 a sharply divided plurality of
the Court of Appeals, in United States v. Moore,528 viewed neither
Robinson nor Powell as offering any precedent for an eighth
amendment drug defense and affirmed the conviction of a nontraf-
ficking addict for possession.
In Moore appellant argued that common-law principles dic-
tated that the capacity of an accused addict to control his criminal
behavior was a prerequisite to imposing criminal liability for the
illegal acts of purchase, possession, and use of drugs to satisfy the
addict's personal craving.521 Integrally related to this argument was
523. 439 F.2d at 451. The court's discussion of the distinction between trafficking and
nontrafficking addicts was instigated by the appellant's contention that the crucial question
was not whether a defendant was an addict or non-addict, but whether he was a trafficking
or nontrafficking addict. This argument is more palatable to those who resist the creation of
a drug defense, since the implications for reducing the narcotics traffic are less radical. See
Comment, supra note 495, at 377.
524. 439 F.2d at 451. The Watson court was hesitant to make such a holding based on
the insufficiency of the trial record. Id. at 453.
525. In United States v. Ashton, 317 F. Supp. 860 (D.D.C. 1970), the court seized upon
the dicta in Watson to hold that a nontrafficking addict could not be punished under the
federal narcotics statutes, basing its holding on the alternate grounds of statutory interpre-
tation and the eighth amendment. See quote cited in note 520 supra. Accord, United States
v. Lindsey, 324 F. Supp. 55 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd without opinion, 479 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (by implication) (defendant did not prove by preponderance of the evidence he was
nontrafficking addict); contra, Wheeler v. United States, 276 A.2d 722 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).
526. 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973). Spanning 120 pages
and containing six separate opinions, Moore represents the most comprehensive and exhaus-
tive judicial attempt to explore the scope of the addict's criminal responsibility.
527. The appellant framed the issue as follows:
Is the . . . evidence of. . . [appellant's] dependence on (addiction to) injected heroin,
resulting in substantial impairment of his behavior controls and a loss of self-control
over the use of heroin, relevant to his criminal responsibility for unlawful possession
486 F.2d at 1144.
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the appellant's contention that the eighth amendment as con-
strued in Robinson and Powell precluded holding a nontrafficking
addict liable for simple possession of heroin.5 28
The Moore plurality interpreted Robinson as limited clearly to
situations which concerned conviction for status alone.529 The plu-
rality viewed Powell as perpetuating the status-act dichotomy be-
cause the defendant in that case was ultimately held criminally
responsibile. The court further noted that in Powell the initial act
of ingesting an alcoholic beverage was not illegal, while in Moore
the initial intake of narcotics was prohibited.3 Clearly apprehen-
sive about the practical problems that would result from imple-
menting the proposed drug defense, 531 the plurality found no basis
for the defense in the common law notions of mens rea, duress, or
necessity.532 In addition, the Moore court found the paradox of al-
lowing the addict-possessor to vitiate his criminal accountability
while levying criminal punishment for acts not incidental to addic-
tion to be analytically troublesome and logically inconsistent.533
The dissent viewed the "disease prong" of Robinson and the
court's decision in Easter as ample precedent for the drug defense.
The dissenters believed the common law concept of mens rea had
evolved sufficiently to encompass a defense to charges of posses-
sion and use against "a drug addict who, by reason of his use of
drugs, lacks substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of the law. . . ,,153 Engaging in a cost-benefit analysis
The Government admitted appellant's heroin addiction. Testimony was elicited from
the appellant at trial that he had never engaged in drug trafficking and was present at the
site of arrest only to purchase heroin for his own use.
528. Appellant's third argument in Moore was based on statutory grounds-that Con-
gress had constructively exempted a nontrafficking addict from criminal penalties for pos-
session, use, and purchase. Id. at 1142-43.
529. The majority also did not consider Robinson to have based its eighth amendment
rationale on any loss of compulsion or self-control that might support a narcotics addiction
defense. Id. at 1048-50.
530. Id. at 1151. This distinction would obviously not be pertinent when a defendant-
addict had acquired his habit through the use of a legal prescription. Furthermore, it is
doubtful that the question whether addiction was acquired through a legal or nonlegal act is
germane to a "free-will" analysis-for example, when an insanity defense is asserted, how
one's condition was acquired is not material; the issue is the state of mind of the defendant
at the time of the alleged offense. See Part IV supra.
531. Id. at 1144-46.
532. Id. at 1178-81.
533. The court noted that "if it is absence of free will which excuses the mere posses-
sor-acquirer, the more desperate bank robber for drug money has an even more demonstra-
ble lack of free will and derived from precisely the same factors as appellant argues should
excuse the mere possessor." Id. at 1146 (original emphasis removed).
534. Id. at 1209 (Wright, J., dissenting). Chief Judge Bazelon, mindful of the inconsis-
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to rebut the majority's determination that the practical disloca-
tions caused by the proposed defense would not justify its adop-
tion, the dissent concluded that civil commitment of the nontraf-
ficking adult was a viable alternative. Such an approach, according
to the dissent, would be consistent with congressional intent,53 5
would offer more effective rehabilitation without the stigma of
criminal conviction, and would relieve an overcrowded criminal
court system inundated with drug offenders.5 s6
Moore was the last significant attempt to utilize the cruel and
unusual punishment provision of the eighth amendment as a vehi-
cle to relieve a narcotics addict of criminal responsibility for acts
symptomatic of his addiction. The purview of Robinson has now
been uniformly established to be extremely narrow-it precludes
only the punishment of a status or condition when no accompany-
ing criminal act is present. The nature and history of the cruel and
unusual punishment clause, however, suggests that evolving no-
tions of what is considered to be humane, civilized, and morally
decent by our society can be expected to again alter the presently
well-defined boundaries of the eighth amendment and question the
validity of the status-act dichotomy.
C. State Constitutional Law
While the federal courts have not interpreted the eighth
tency noted by the majority in restricting the defense to addicts charged with possessory
offenses, advocated relieving an addict of criminal responsibility for any act if, because of
the duress or compulsion caused by his habit, he was unable to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law. Id. at 1260 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
535. Since Congress had not "expressly and unequivocally manifested its intent to
preclude such a defense," it was within the province of the judiciary to establish a drug
defense in order for "the law . . . [to serve] the needs of the present." 486 F.2d at 1249
(Wright, J., dissenting). The dissent emphasized that Title II of the Narcotics Addict Reha-
bilitation Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251-4255 (1970), which applied to both Watson and Moore,
provided for involuntary civil commitment procedures for an addict after he had been con-
victed of the criminal offense. Id. at 1247.
536. The procedural nightmares foreseen by the majority that would result from the
adoption of a drug defense were, in the dissent's view, largely imaginary. As suggested in
Watson, a defendant would raise the proposed defense as an affirmative defense at trial and
bear the burden of going forward with some evidence of addiction. See note 510 supra. The
prosecution would then bear the burden of proving the defendant's nonaddiction beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 1259 (Wright, J., dissenting). Analogous to an insanity defense, the
question of the defendant's addiction would be for the trier of fact to resolve on the basis of
any evidence relevant to the issue of criminal responsibility, including expert testimony.
The ultimate issue would be "whether, at the time of the offense, the defendant, as a result
of his repeated use of narcotics, lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law." Id. at 1258 (Wright, J., dissenting). Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01
(1962).
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amendment as barring criminal prosecution for acts compelled by
a defendant's addiction, a state court is free to construe its corre-
sponding state constitutional guarantees more broadly. In response
to the narrowing of the scope of constitutional protections by the
Burger Court, particularly in the area of criminal procedure, a
trend emerged among higher state courts of interpreting state con-
stitutional provisions to afford greater protection to an accused
than the parallel, often identical, provisions in the United States
Constitution. 37 Such state court holdings, if based at least in part
on state constitutional law, are not subject to review by the federal
courts since they rest on "adequate and independent state
grounds"; consideration of federal issues is unnecessary if the con-
clusion is predicated on state law. 38
An example of the utilization of state constitutional provisions
to proscribe state conduct deemed permissible under the eighth
537. Mosk, Contemporary Federalism, 9 PAC. L.J. 711, 718 (1978). See Scott v. State,
519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974); Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226 (Alaska 1969); People v. Dis-
brow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976); People v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d
943, 538 P.2d 753, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1975); People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d
1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975); Reynolds v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 834, 528 P.2d 45, 117
Cal. Rptr. 437 (1974); Blocker v. Blackburn, 228 Ga. 285, 185 S.E.2d 56 (1971); Corley v.
Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971); State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 520 P.2d 51
(1974); State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971); Haas v. South Bend Comm.
Sch. Corp., 259 Ind. 515, 289 N.E.2d 495 (1972); State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa
1974); People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 878 (1975);
People v. White, 390 Mich. 245, 212 N.W.2d 222 (1973); People v. Turner, 390 Mich. 7, 210
N.W.2d 336 (1973); State v. Granberry, 491 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. 1973); Baker v. State, 88 Nev.
369, 498 P.2d 1310 (1972); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975); Robinson v.
Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973); Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974);
Chandler v. State, 501 P.2d 512 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1972); State v. Brown, 262 Ore. 442,
497 P.2d 1191 (1972); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975); Common.
wealth v. Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974); State ex
rel. Payne v. Walden, 156 W. Va. 60, 190 S.E.2d 770 (1972); McConville v. State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Crimi-
nal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421, 450 (1974).
538. "This Court from the time of its foundation has adhered to the principle that it
will not review judgments of state courts that rest on adequate and independent state
grounds .... [O]ur power is to correct wrong judgments, not ... to render ... advisory
opinion[s] .... Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-27 (1945). In recent years, the Supreme
Court has been vigilantly reviewing state court decisions that purport to expand protection
of civil liberties on the basis of both state and federal constitutional provisions to insure
that state law furnishes an independent ground for the result. See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420
U.S. 714 (1975) (reversing Oregon Supreme Court ruling that U.S. Constitution barred use
for impeachment purposes of statements obtained in violation of Miranda); People v.
Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971), vacated and remanded, 409
U.S. 33 (1972) (judgment vacated and cause remanded to California Supreme Court to clar-
ify whether state or federal constitution utilized to rule defendant had reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in trash).
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amendment is People v. Anderson.539 In Anderson, the Supreme
Court of California ruled that the death penalty violated the Cali-
fornia constitution's section forbidding cruel or unusual punish-
ment.5 40 Although a state constitutional referendum was passed to
override the decision, the case illustrates a possible argument open
to defense attorneys in drug cases. While many states explicitly
interpret their constitutional bans on cruel and unusual punish-
ment as having the same parameters as the eighth amendment, 54 1
other states might be willing to extend the protection afforded by
their cruel and unusual punishment prohibitions beyond federal
constitutional precedents. Notwithstanding the fact that most of
the state court cases expanding the defendant's protection have
not dealt with substantive limitations on the power of the state to
impose criminal punishment,5 42 the defense attorney should be
aware of Justice Brennan's admonition:
[T]he decisions of the Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of ques-
tions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state law.
[S]tate court judges, and also practitioners, do well to scrutinize constitu-
tional decisions by federal courts .... I suggest to the bar that, although in
the past it might have been safe for counsel to raise only federal constitu-
tional issues in state courts, plainly it would be most unwise these days not
also to raise the state constitutional questions."3
VI. CONCLUSION
This Special Project has carried out three broad purposes.
First, it has synthesized and organized materials concerning drugs
and criminal responsibility into a useful guide for legal practition-
ers and others interested in the problems of the drug dependent
defendant. Second, it has identified serious analytical flaws in
many of the defenses available to the criminal defendant. Finally,
it has responded to these deficiencies with proposals intended to
539. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
540. CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 6 (1849), amended 1974 (now art. 1, § 17). In Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that the death penalty per
se does not violate the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment. Id. at 187; Note, Expanding State Constitutional Protections and the New Silver
Platter: After They've Shut the Door, Can They Bar the Window?, 8 Loy. Cm. L.J. 186
(1976).
541. See, e.g., Cozzolino v. State, 584 S.W.2d 765 (Tenn. 1979), in which the Tennes-
see Supreme Court ruled that the Tennessee constitution's ban on cruel and unusual pun-
ishment places no greater restriction on punishment than does the federal constitution. Id.
at 767.
542. See cases cited in note 537 supra.
543. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489, 502 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
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protect not only the legal rights of the drug dependent defendant
but also the rights of society pertaining to criminal justice. While
these societal interests include the swift imposition of criminal
penalties when warranted, they should not be allowed to diminish
the concomitant rights of the criminal defendant. In fact, societal
rights would be better served by a reexamination and reinterpreta-
tion of several traditional legal theories concerning drugs and crim-
inal defendants. A recognition by courts and legislatures of the ex-
isting analytical flaws should lead to the development of more
equitable theories and a search for alternative forms of treatment
and rehabilitation for the drug dependent defendant. Rather than
hiding behind the guise of legal history and moral judgment, courts
and legislatures should respond to illogical and insufficient theories
that fail to deal with the drug dependent defendant in an equitable
and just manner.
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